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ABSTRACT
Prestige is a term that appears in a wide range of international relations literature,
but it is rarely ever defined. There is a vague consensus that prestige involves measures of
status and respect, but its exact usage is different in every work. This thesis analyzes the
various manifestations of prestige to develop a workable definition of the concept and then
uses this definition to show how prestige plays a role in the major foreign policy decisions
of states.
This thesis argues that prestige motivations can overcome security concerns in
some instances and cause a state to take an action that seems irrational. This is especially
true if the state has recently suffered a severe drop in prestige, such as one incurred after
losing a war, becoming isolated from the international community or facing state collapse.
When such a dramatic loss occurs a state must take one of four paths to salvage its lost
reputation: winning a war, becoming an economic power, taking the lead on an important
political negotiation or developing nuclear weapons.
This thesis uses two large case studies - Iran and Egypt - along with three smaller
case surveys - France, Japan and Pakistan - to illustrate these four paths of status
adjustment in action. It also presents a dataset of states that have suffered a severe loss in
prestige to show how states can lose prestige and how they can gain it back.
Thesis Supervisor: Roger Petersen
Title: Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
I. Introduction
Prestige is a concept often taken for granted in the study of international relations.
It is mentioned as an element of "soft power" in works otherwise unconcerned with the
term. Many people assume that prestige is a rather static measurement and, therefore, an
uninteresting area of study. According to these scholars certain states have high status
while others barely even register in the international system This is an unfair diminution of
the concept.
Status is not a static measurement; it is not even measured on the same scale for
every state. The highest level of prestige that one state can ever hope to reach may be the
bottom level for another. States are continuously fighting to retain their position relative to
others and it is important to their political, economic and physical security that they do so.
When a state endures a dramatic and debilitating loss, such as one incurred by
suffering defeat in a large-scale war, becoming isolated from the international community,
experiencing a failure of central authority or not being recognized as a true state its level of
prestige suffers along with its military, economic and political structure. A state that is not
respected and included in international affairs has no hope of achieving its goals and
experiencing the benefits of multinational support. In order to regain its proper place in the
world the state must take dramatic steps toward increasing its prestige and climbing the
status ladder from the bottom up.
While there is relatively little research done on the concept of prestige it is still
possible to identify three main courses of status adjustment: economic, political and
military. In this thesis I will examine all three of these options and argue for inclusion of a
fourth: the pursuit of nuclear weapons. All four paths are extremely risky and require
extensive resources, but are well worth it if a state is able to increase its level of prestige in
the end.
States suffering a dramatic drop in prestige will be more risk acceptant than those
who have existed at their current status level for years or even decades. Leaders will be
willing to take drastic measures to increase their status even if it means placing their
security or well being in jeopardy for the short term. Prestige can outweigh security
concerns at times. Understanding this fact helps explain some controversial decisions
states have made over the years.
II. Defining Prestige
Prestige is a term referenced in a wide variety of international relations literature
and it is often defined differently in each work. In this paper I use the word prestige
synonymous with status. Both concepts take many forms including respect, legitimacy,
centrality and positioning in negotiations. At the bottom line, though, prestige boils down
to one thing: attention.
States want to be noticed. A state that is marginalized and ignored has no place in
international relations and no hope of getting its goals met or opinions heard. States need
recognition in order to function normally and create an identity for themselves that is acts
on a global scale. Even negative attention is better than no attention at all.
Status can come in two forms: ascribed and attained. Ascribed status is granted to a
state based on its fundamental features and characteristics. A strong economy, large
population, wealth of natural resources, superior military power or even possession of
important religious elements may contribute to the ascribed status of the state. Some of
these factors - such as military power and the economy - can change from time to time, but
still generally fall within a limited range.
Another way to think of ascribed status is as the measurement of how others view
the focal state. The level of prestige ascribed to a state is generally accepted across the
international community and serves as a base by which it is judged in all international
relations. States with a high ascribed status will be viewed with respect and have a high
degree of centrality. States with very low status, on the other hand, are largely ignored on
an international level and have to seek ways to draw global attention, whether positive or
negative. It is better to be hated or feared than to be forgotten. A state that is feared is at
least being acknowledge on a global scale and acknowledgement is the first step toward
becoming involved.
The activities that a state performs in order to change this baseline measurement
are the elements that contribute to "attained" status. These activities may take place in the
military, economic, political or ideological realm and will vary depending on the state's
goals and resources.
The most common path for states seeking status adjustment is the pursuit of
military victories. Wars are highly visible and, in most cases, the results are difficult to
dispute. Achieving a series of victories over a rival would automatically raise the state
above its opponent and possibly above other states that have been unable to achieve the
same level of success. Victory proves to the world that a state has the resources and skills
needed to make it a formidable opponent and garner respect internationally.
Achieving victory in war is not an easy task, though. Some states have been unable
to achieve major military victories in their past and many have suffered humiliating losses.
These losses can actually decrease the attained status of a state, as each one chips away at
its reputation, legitimacy and perceived strength. A history of humiliating losses lowers the
ascribed status of a state by labeling it as an inherent "loser" and making others doubt how
much they can contribute to society.
A person can only suffer so much humiliation before he is compelled to fight back;
states are no different. True humiliation only comes when factors that a state feels are key
to its identity suddenly collapse or deflate. The loss of these features fundamentally
changes the way the state is viewed by others and the role it is allowed to play in the
international system.1 In other words, humiliation fundamentally alters the ascribed status
of a state and, therefore, the way in which it is treated by both allies and enemies alike.
On the state level, humiliation is often reflected in the nationalism of the population.
The people of a state take it upon themselves to become the champions of their reputation
and to tout the state's power and prestige. Continuous losses in battle or in major political
arenas will chip away at this nationalism until it runs the risk of collapsing and forcing the
people to turn on their own state.
Nationalism is an incredibly strong form of identity and, like all forms of identity
politics, never truly operates on an individual scale. Members of an identity group must
always be aware of how others are representing them as a whole and if enough people
believe they are being represented poorly, they will take drastic measures to revive their
image.2 In the context of a state, it is up to the government to initiate this revival or else risk
initiating a popular revolt.
Once the opportunity for revival of the national identity is found, leaders must find a
way to rally the people around their decision, no matter how controversial it may be. They
do so by appealing to the pride and nationalism of the population.
Prestige v. "Hard" Power
It can be difficult to differentiate between the concepts of prestige from power, but
it is important to do so. The two are not one in the same and treating them as such results
in analytical and political mistakes. Changes in a state's power may increase or decrease its
status and vice versa, but the two attributes are not always related.
1 Miller, "Humiliation and Other Essays" Miller's analysis is sociological in nature and,
therefore, looks at humiliation on an individual level. I have abstracted his definition to the
state level.
2 Laitin, "Identity in Formation."
Prestige is not a measure of material power; it is a potentiality and a matter of
positioning in the international community. A state that achieves a significant amount of
prestige is in a position to exercise the power that it does have in the international
community when needed. This may refer to military and economic power, but it is also
relevant to soft power and influence. Prestigious states play an active role in the
international community and serve as a valuable participant in multinational talks and
actions.
A state with a high level of prestige is valued and respected by its allies regardless of
its material capabilities. It is met with deference and caution by rivals and often looked to
for advice by neighbors and allies. Prestigious states are almost always invited to the
negotiating table when their interests are at stake and are able to have their opinions heard
and considered. The higher the status of a state, the more likely that state will be able to
convince others to follow the path most conducive to its goals and interests. The lower its
status, the more likely it will just be ignored and forced to follow along in a world other
states have created for it.
Prestige is largely a measure of comparison, both regionally and globally. States
want to have a higher status than their neighbors, allowing them to become a regional
power. This gives them a more important position in discussions of regional issues and a
higher potential of achieving their goals. Some scholars argue that reaching such a position
of regional important would be easier through military or "hard power" means.3 This may
be true, but it would be a much more tenuous hold.
Achieving regional supremacy through the military may be quicker, but it also
provides rivals with a clear avenue for overturning the balance of power. If a state wins its
3 Thomas Schelling makes this point when he states "with enough military force a country
may not need to bargain. Some things a country wants it can take, and some things it has it
can keep, by sheer strength, skill and ingenuity". Schelling, "Arms and Influence", 1; The
strength of military power over international politics is the main thread tying together all
of the works in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz's anthology The Use of Force. Art and Waltz,
"The Use of Force".
superiority through war, it can simply be attacked and replaced. Its entire position was
based on the victory of a single war and as such is cancelled out by a subsequent loss. The
use of force does not necessarily guarantee the state a voice in international affairs either.
It may actually hurt the state's bargaining position by making it a target of animosity and
distrust.
Pursuing regional power through military means makes the state a target for
retaliation and a central enemy for its neighbors. Military victory or the threat of military
action may have both coercive and defensive power, but its effect is only temporary. Hard
power influence can be countered by more hard power in a never-ending cycle of one-
upmanship.
The real measure of a state's power lies in its level of influence. If the state does not
hold a position of regional importance due only to its military power, its hold on that
position will be stronger. A state that is respected by those around it and that has ties to
other powerful nations cannot simply be attacked and replaced. High status states garner
more support and sympathy for their actions internationally. They form alliances with
powerful nations and can often negotiate protection or assistance. Attacking such a
prestigious state would most likely result in multilateral retaliation against the aggressor
and condemnation by the international community.
A state that has regional prestige may still be low on the global scale. Every region
has its own level of prestige and states must constantly seek to improve their standings
above and beyond previous limits. If a state can forge ties with other nations outside of its
region and insert itself into global affairs, it will solidify its position of regional importance
and its overall centrality in the international community. The quickest way to do this would
be by developing a close relationship with one of the world's major powers.
If the state cannot create such strong toes, though, it may seek to make itself into a
global problem instead. Becoming a state that is hated and feared is much easier than
earning global respect and can be the first step toward achieving real, lasting prestige. A
state that is ignored by the international community must simply drift along as a pawn in a
major power game. A state that is acknowledged as a global problem, though, plays a more
active role. It is constantly on the global radar and, as such, may have the opportunity to
change international opinions at some point in the future.
III. Definitions
Outside of the terms prestige and status, there are a few other words I use centrally
in this work that may have multiple meanings. To reduce confusion later on, I will provide a
brief definition here of how I am using them.
Proliferation
Proliferation may seem like a straightforward term, but it can be used in a variety of
ways. When I use the term nuclear proliferation in this work, I am using it in a military
sense. I am not referring to the pursuit of technology and knowledge needed for purely
civilian nuclear energy programs. I define proliferation as the pursuit of a nuclear program
for the purpose of weaponization, whether or not that capability is ever achieved. This
pursuit may be declared publicly by the state - as North Korea did following its 2006
nuclear test - or it may just be accepted as fact by the majority of states - as in the case of
Iran - even if the state denies such pursuits.
Nuclear State
The term Nuclear State is used in this work to describe those states that possess a
complete and internationally acknowledged nuclear weapons capability. By this definition
there are currently nine nuclear weapons states (The United States, Russia, The United
Kingdom, France, China, Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea). Other states pursuing
nuclear proliferation, such as Iran, may be on the path toward becoming a nuclear state,
but have not yet achieved this capability.
South Africa is the only state I consider to be a former nuclear state. The former
Soviet Republics - Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan - are not considered former nuclear
states because their arsenals were inherited from the Soviet Union and were given up
shortly after the states became independent. The nuclear programs in these states were
never institutionalized by their independent governments.
Isolation
I will refer to a handful of states throughout this work as being in a stage of
"isolation." This refers to a state that has few or no political allies, very limited trading
partners and is an object of international scorn or scrutiny. Often these states are also
subject to sanctions by multiple states or by the United Nations, but sanctions are not a
prerequisite for being considered isolated. These states are often referred to in
international discussions as "rogue" or "pariah" states4.
My definition of isolated states only refers to those states whose isolation is
imposed on them by others. States who choose a path of self-isolation because they believe
it will help them achieve their goals are not included. Neither are states that have a low
level of connections simply because they are minor powers that do not need a large
diplomatic or trading base in order to operate normally.5
IV. Current Literature
Since prestige is such a difficult concept to define, it appears in many different
genres of political science literature, often with different definitions and presentations.
4 Harkavy defines a pariah state as "a small power with only marginal and tenuous control
over its own fate, whose security dilemma cannot easily be solved by neutrality,
nonalignment or appeasement, and lacking dependable big-power support". I would add a
further caveat to this definition which is that this lack of power is a deliberate attempt by
major powers to isolate the state, either as punishment or through a lack of recognition.
Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation."
s For a detailed discussion of isolation, it's causes, indicators and forms, see: Geldenhuys,
"Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis" Geldenhuys differentiates between the two
forms of isolation by defining it as "either a deliberate policy, voluntarly and unilaterally
pursued by a state over a period of time, of restricting its international interactions ... or a
deliberate policy pursued by two or more states against another, over a period of time,
aimed at severing or curtailing the latter's international interactions againt its will." Ibid., 6.
Prestige appears in literature on nationalism, war, leadership, international organizations
and many other topics. The literature on status adjustment, though, is surprisingly light.
There is not a large volume of literature on state status adjustment and even less
dedicated to the four particular paths I examine in this work. Some sources served as quite
valuable resources in developing my theory, though, and deserve further explanation here.
Prestige
The literature on prestige spans nearly the entire history of international relations
and the breadth of its subfields as well. The study of state status grew out of the study of
power, the most fundamental element of international relations. Many works on the topic
of power - and there are thousands of them - mention state status as an element of
ideological or soft power. Some even use it as a key determinant in power theories.
Hans Morgenthau provides what is arguably the most well known characterization
of prestige in international relations in his book Politics Among Nations.6 Morgenthau
defines of prestige as "the third of the basic manifestations of the struggle for power on the
international scene."7 This definition gives prestige an active quality. It is not a static
concept, but something that is constantly being reshaped on an international scale. It is
subject to changes as the state succeeds or fails in its international pursuits. He qualifies
this statement, though, by saying that prestige is more a tool of policy makers rather than
an end in and of itself. States use their nationalism and image to achieve their goals; they do
not pursue controversial policies expressly for the purpose of increasing their status.
As Morgenthau explains it, the political struggle for prestige is present in nearly all
diplomatic and military relations. Yet he recognizes that it is largely understudied in
political science. He wrote this statement in 1948, but it is still relevant today. There are
very few works written in recent years that give due consideration to prestige as a major
6 Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations."
7The first two being policies of status quo and imperialism; Ibid., 84.
factor driving international relations. One recent work that does this quite well, though, is
John Mearsheimer's Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
For John Mearsheimer, status is only important when states reach the level of a
"great power" because the realm of great power politics is governed by different rules than
the rest of the world. 8 Great powers, according to his theory, are always searching for ways
to increase their status and prove to the world that they are the only state that matters.
They will perform feats of military, economic and political power in the international
system, showing the world that they cannot be stopped. These paths are often self-
defeating, though, because they foster fear and scorn from other states rather than respect
and prestige.
I take a slightly wider view of prestige than Mearsheimer, but I agree with his belief
that status is more important to those states who have it and lose it rather than those who
have always been at the bottom of the ladder. This is why my dataset and case studies are
limited to those states that can be considered major powers on an international scale.
These states feel a drop in prestige more clearly than minor powers and serve as a better
illustration of status adjustment
Kenneth Waltz discusses state status throughout his Theory of International Politics,
but fails to come up with a single concrete definition. At one point he says that status can be
granted by the system and is defined by the state's ability to meet its goals on an
international scale. He also states that it may be possible to infer a state's status based on
the way it is treated by the United States. For Waltz, status cannot be gleaned from military
power because capabilities and political control no longer go hand-in-hand.
The variety of definitions and measures listed in Waltz's work shows how difficult
prestige is to define on an international scale. He provides a good overview of theories on
state status and power, but never settles on the one he believes is the best. His survey of
8 Mearsheimer, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics."
definitions serves as a good base for creating a more concrete and workable definition of
prestige, though.
Not all works on status and prestige are as well known as the above books. Zeev
Maoz's Networks of Nations takes a uniquely business-like approach to international
relations by studying it as a series of network interactions.9 For Maoz, prestige cannot be
defined merely by where a state believes it stands, but "by the choices of other states to
forge cooperative ties with the focal state."10 He uses the term status synonymously with
reputation and credibility.
Maoz's two-tiered approach to prestige is very similar to my definition of "ascribed"
and "attained" status. His analysis is very technical in nature and rarely looks at individual
states outside of their networks, but it provides a unique insight into how drastically status
can change state relations. His belief that recognition by others is an important element of
status is shared by Felix Berenskoetter in his book Power in World Politics".
Berenskoetter argues that "even the status of a great power or global civil society
relies on 'significant others' recognizing its status."12 He believes that status is just one
element in the overall "power" game of international relations. Like Waltz, Berenskoetter
never settles on a single definition for either status or prestige.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the current literature on prestige is
that it is a difficult concept to qualify and often changes over time. Status is not a static
element of the international system. It is subject to reevaluation whenever there are major
changes in the political, military, economic or organization structure of international
system.
9 Maoz, "Networks of Nations."
10 Ibid., 212.
11 Berenskoetter, "Thinking about Power."
12 Ibid., 14.
War as a Tool of Prestige
Winning a war provides a state with glory. This is a universally acknowledged fact
that is rarely, if ever, a subject of debate. How that glory can be used to increase a state's
prestige on an international scale, though, is a much less common topic of study. The subset
of theories that comes the closest to discussing the utility of war for status adjustment is
that of diversionary war.
The theory of diversionary war comes in many iterations, with slight changes in
each generation of the theory. Its origin is generally attributed to John Mueller and what he
referred to as the "rally around the flag variable."13 In studying Presidential popularity in
the United States Mueller discovered that those Presidents who were in office when a
major international crisis - such as war - occurred received more support and higher
approval ratings from the national population. Americans draw together during times of
crisis and experience swells of nationalism and pride. At the same time a crisis that is
poorly managed is likely to result in anger and a loss of support for the leader.
Mueller does not examine how leaders may purposely involve themselves in crisis
events in order to increase popularity, but he set the ball in motion for a whole new
subfield of political science. In its early years diversionary war literature mainly focused on
the United States, but recently it has developed to look at the phenomenon across the
international system. Most books and articles on diversionary war study what types of
political systems and leaders are most likely to use it as a tactic and which ones are likely to
do so successfully.
Some scholars argue that democratic leaders are more likely to launch a
diversionary war because they need the support for reelection, but have fewer
opportunities to do so because of regime transparency.14 Others argue that authoritarian
13 Mueller, "Presidential Popularity," 21.
14 Mitchell and Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force."
leaders have no use for diversionary war because they can simply repress internal conflict
militarily without being held accountable to a voting constituency.15
The number of works promoting the theory of diversionary war is almost matched
by the number refuting the utility of such a theory. Regardless of what side they are on,
though, all scholars view diversionary war with one definition: purposely launching a war
to distract from domestic unrest. My theory expands on this definition and looks at how
states may also use war to regain pride and prestige after suffering a loss on an
international scale.
Nuclear Proliferation
Nuclear weapons have been a hot topic in international relations research ever since
World War II. There is a large volume of literature discussing the effects of proliferation on
the international system - will it have positive or negative implications for stability?16 - the
possibility of proliferation cascades, the history of nuclear research and the various means
states can use to develop nuclear weapons. The topic of why states pursue nuclear
weapons, though, is relatively understudied.
This lack of research stems from the belief that nuclear weapons are a tool of
deterrence. John Mearsheimer summarizes this belief by stating ,"that threat to use nuclear
weapons is an excellent deterrent because it so greatly increases the risks and costs
associated with war. The potential consequences of using nuclear weapons are so grave
that it is very difficult to conceive of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear war."17
This boils down to one simple conclusion: states want nuclear weapons in order to increase
their security and protect themselves from attack.
15 Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions."
16The most well-known of these debates is the Waltz-Sagan debate over whether nuclear
weapons lead to peace or insecurity. Sagan and Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons."
17 Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe."
This may be true, but that does not mean that there are not other motivations for
proliferation as well. The one-sided belief that "at a fundamental level, all nuclear bomb
development programs constitute a response to insecurity and a form of balancing against
foreign threats - be they political or military in nature" limit the breadth of analysis that can
be conducted on proliferation.18 It ignores the possibility of prestige as a motivating factor
in nuclear proliferation and leaves many theories on proliferation with weak explanatory
power.
Many articles on proliferation address the concept of prestige, but only as a
secondary or tertiary motivation. There is rarely any in depth discussion of the topic or
assessment of how nuclear weapons can be used as a tool of status adjustment. There are
some works that provide insight to non-security explanations for nuclear proliferation,
though, that have served as valuable resources in my research.
Scott Sagan's article "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons" is one of the most cited
articles on nuclear proliferation due to its three-pronged approach to explaining nuclear
motivations.19 Sagan creates three distinct models to explain proliferation: security,
domestic politics and norms. According to the security model, states pursue nuclear
weapons as a means to ensure state security and survivability. Under the domestic politics
model nuclear weapons are used as a tool for achieving political and bureaucratic goals at
home. The norms model is essentially an argument that nuclear weapons are used to
achieve international prestige.
As Sagan explains, military organizations and weapons - of which nuclear weapons
would be the most powerful - serve as a source of national pride and a rallying point for
the people.20 At the same time, though, he cautions that the NPT has shifted the
international norm from a belief in a high status "nuclear club" to that of "joining the club of
nations adhering to the NPT." He argues that this new club provides a more powerful form
18 Lavoy, "Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade."
19 Sagan, " Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?", 74.
20 Ibid., 74.
of international recognition and respect.21 Sagan's backtracking weakens the case he makes
for his norms model, but it is still a valuable resource nonetheless. He shows that each case
of proliferation is different and there is no single blanket theory that can explain all cases.
Jacques Hymans's book The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation presents a unique
perspective on the issue of nuclear proliferation by examining the human psychology
behind the decision to go nuclear.22 He argues that leaders with different "National Identity
Conceptions (NIC)" view the issue of proliferation differently. What NIC a leader has will
determine whether he will pursue nuclear power.
The national identity conception has two dimensions: solidarity - "whether 'we' and
'they' naturally stand for similar or different interests and values" 2 3 - and status - "how high
'we' stand relative to 'them' in the international pecking order."24 He codes for these
dimensions using speech evidence from the heads of state. Those leaders who seem to be
most oppositional and nationalistic are the ones most likely to pursue nuclear weapons.
The main element missing from Hymans' analysis is the effect that the domestic
population has on the decision to go nuclear. He analysis is based solely on the beliefs and
motivations of the leader. According to Hymans, the head of state is always the person who
initiates a nuclear program and, therefore, his psychology is the most important factor in
predicting potential proliferation. This argument does not leave room for analyzing how
nationalist coalitions, a dissatisfied population or changes in the popularity of the leader
may affect his decision-making.
The recent dissertation by Robert Reardon Nuclear Bargaining: Using Carrots and
Sticks in Nuclear Counter-Proliferation gives significant consideration to prestige as a
motivation for proliferation by examining the policies used to address states in various
21 Ibid., 76.
22 Hymans, "The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation."
23 Ibid., 22.
24 Ibid., 23.
stages of proliferation. 25 Reardon theorizes that positive inducements - or carrots - work
better than threats - or sticks - as tools of counter-proliferation. He illustrates this through
case studies of North Korea, South Korea and Libya. He examines the way the state was
treated by others in political negotiations and how threats and inducements brought about
changes in their nuclear weapons programs.
In his analysis Reardon concludes that "the security context was not a sufficient
cause of proliferation" in any of the cases.2 6 He drew thins conclusion from the fact that
positive inducements were more effective and bringing about compromises and halting
potential proliferators. The need for respect, recognition and prestige played an important
role in all cases of nuclear negotiation.
The main focus of Reardon's dissertation, though, is on policy analysis and options
for counter-proliferation. He does not examine the ways in which proliferation can help
states achieve status nor does he consider alternate paths a state could take. His work
served as a valuable factual and theoretical reference for my research, but differs greatly in
theory and method.
There is no single work or body of works that fully encompasses my theory of status
adjustment using four distinct paths. This is what makes it an important and necessary
topic of study. I was able to pull from a wide variety of literature on everything from
international relations to economics, psychology and even sociology. My work comes from
a broad factual base and, as such, has more credence and applicability in the world today.
Scholarly work cannot exist in the vacuum of "departments" or "fields" and still be relevant
to real life. The world is a complicated, intertwined system and the best theories reflect this
complicated and diverse nature. The works discussed above are just a handful of the
hundreds that helped me develop my theory into an understandable and useful form.
25 Reardon, "Nuclear bargaining."
26 Ibid., 371.
CHAPTER 2: DATASET
I. Introduction
To better illustrate my theory of status adjustment I created a dataset of states that
have suffered a dramatic drop in prestige and examined the various paths taken by those
states to increase their status to an acceptable level.
In order to limit my data to an illustrative and easily understandable set of cases I
only included states that were listed among the top 50 most powerful just at or before their
drop.27 All states can experience drops in prestige, but for those states at the forefront of
international affairs these drops are more pronounced and garner a more immediate
response.
For the purpose of this dataset, states were coded as having suffered a status drop
mainly for one of three reasons: losing a war, international isolation, or state failure.
A Note About The Data
The presentation of this data in a clearly delineated table sorted by events makes
prestige appear to be a static measure that is relevant only when a state suffers a drop and
becomes irrelevant once a status-changing path is chose. In reality, prestige is a continuum
that is constantly increasing and decreasing over time. Small losses or victories are
constantly adjusting a state's level of prestige bit by bit. And major drops in status may take
place over years or decades with the recovery period lasting even longer.
In order to present a clear and concise picture of the concept, though, I chose to only
show major drops in prestige and to label them with their end years. These events are
easier to view individually and produce a comprehensible amount of data.
27 According to the Correlates of War national material capabilities dataset; Singer et al,
"Capability Distribution."
For the sake of simplicity, I only coded the cases for the first path chosen for
adjustment. Many states will take more than one path, though. The first path may not work
out or it may ease the state's loss enough that it is able to pursue a more difficult but
potentially more rewarding path. Some states may also take steps toward status
adjustment without suffering a drop in prestige. They may wish to increase their state
status from its normal position and chose one or more of the four paths in order to do so.
IL Codebook
The dataset is coded by both event and state. For this reason, there may be more
that one entry for a particular state if it was involved in more than one event and there may
be multiple entries for a single event if more than one state suffered significant losses.
StateName - The name of the state in question. Names are listed in the English
language form used by the United States Department of State
EventType
1 - War Loss
2 - Isolation
3 - State Collapse
4 - Other
EventDate - The date at which the period of lowest status began. For status
resulting from a war loss, this is the end date of the war. For isolation,
this is the beginning date of international sanctions. For state collapse,
this is the date that central authority officially collapsed.
EXCEPTION: For all states that are currently suffering from isolation
and/or state collapse, events are listed as "current" instead of being
listed under the year in which the isolation or collapse began
EventName - The specific name given to the event, if applicable. If not applicable
(ex. In the case of isolation due to international sanctions), a brief
description of the event is included instead
Table 1: Cases of Major Power Status Loss Since World War II
StateName EventType EventDate EventName Path
France 1 1940 WWII 3
Italy 1 1943 WWII 2
Finland 1 1944 WWII 2
Germany 1 1945 WWII 2
Japan 1 1945 WWII 2
Spain 2 1945 International Isolation 2
Egypt 1 1948 Arab-Israeli War 5
India 1 1962 Sino-Indian War 4
South Africa 2 1962 International Sanctions 3
Egypt 1 1967 Six Day War 1
Jordan 1 1967 Six Day War 1
Syria 1 1967 Six Day War 1
Pakistan 1 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War 4
Iran 4 1979 Iranian Revolution 5
Pakistan 1 1984 Siachen Conflicts 4
Libya 1 1987 Toyota War 0
Iran 1 1988 Iran - Iraq War 4
Iraq 1 1991 Gulf War 5
Ethiopia 3 1993 Ousting of Central Govt 5
Georgia 3 1994 Breakdown of Communism 1
Iraq 3 2010 Iraq War 0
North Korea 2 Curent International Sanctions 4
Iran 2 Current International Sanctions 4
Taiwan 4 Current Unrecognized Internationally 2
Path - The path the state chose to adjust its prestige and increase its status
and centrality. If more than one path was taken, the result is coded as
the first path chosen
0 - No Action
1 - War
2 - Economic
3 - Political
4 - Nuclear
5 - Superseded by another event
Coding Timeline
Before beginning the coding process, I had to set a time period for case
consideration. Since the purpose of this thesis is to explain the various paths states can take
to increase their prestige I had to limit my dataset to only those cases where all four
possible paths existed. This set my start date at the end of World War II - the first time that
nuclear weapons could have been used as a tool of prestige.
This start date is important because it limits the dataset to include only the relevant
cases. Events that occurred before the advent of nuclear weapons did not provide states
with the opportunity to pursue proliferation as a means of status attainment. Adding cases
prior to the 1940s would add irrelevant event data that distracts from the purpose of the
dataset and would skew the results in favor of the other three paths.
There is no end date for the dataset since it is still relevant today.
III. Variable Definitions
EventType
The coding for EventType required the most research and selectivity on my part and
deserves further explanation.
War Loss
For the coding of states that lost wars, I began by collecting statistical information
from the Correlates of War Interstate Conflict dataset and the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program Armed Conflict database for the time period in question28 .
I then removed all data events that could not be coded as interstate wars. The
purpose of this distinction was twofold. Firstly, since my theory of status adjustment only
applies to state actors, examining non-state conflicts would add a superfluous level of data.
Secondly, according to my definition of prestige, status is a relative measure of comparison
to other states in the system. Therefore, only a loss of war to another state would cause a
major drop in status. Internal conflicts, civil wars and conflicts with non-state actors may
weaken a state's status, but they would not have the same level of effect as a loss to another
state power.
From this list of conflicts, I then narrowed my selection down by the power
capabilities of the two states involved. Losing a war to a much more powerful state
generally does not cause a status drop because the losing state was never expected to win
and therefore did not harm its reputation or legitimacy. Being defeated by a state with
inferior material capabilities, however, does reflect negatively on the losing state and can
cause a major drop in prestige.
To measure the disparity between combatants I referenced the Correlates of War
National Material Capabilities dataset, which assigns all states a Composite Index National
Capabilities (CINC) score.29 The CINC is based off a measurement of six factors: total
population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditure, iron and steel
production, and energy consumption. The dataset has a separate entry for every state and
year and is a useful tool for comparing the relative material strength of states.
28 Sarkees and Wayman, "Resort to War: 1816 - 2007."
29 Singer et al, "Capability Distribution."
Using the Correlates of War CINC scores I coded states as having a major drop in
status if they were a) defeated by a state ranked at least 15 places below or b) were one of
the 25 most powerful states and were completely devastated in a war, even if it was by a
higher or only slightly lower ranked state. I kept my dataset limited to states ranked within
the top 50 each year since those states would be the ones most affected by a drop in
prestige. Extreme low status states are rarely expected to win wars even against less
powerful opponents and, therefore, would not suffer significant damage to their
international reputation as a result of war loss.
For the purposes of this dataset, all war losses that resulted in dissolution of the
losing state (Such as South Vietnam at the end of the Vietnam war) were also excluded.
Since the state ceased to exist, it no longer had any status or means to achieve such and
would be irrelevant to the collected data.
Isolation
There are general forms that isolation can take in international relations: deliberate
self-isolation and imposed isolation. For the purpose of this data, only states suffering from
imposed isolation were considered. Those states pursuing policies of self-isolation do so of
their own accord and, most likely, for a specific political or economic reason. They do not
suffer the same status drop as states whose isolation is impressed upon them by others.
International isolation is characterized by multilateral attempts to purposely
exclude a target state from international interactions. This is done either as punishment for
a particular action or as a means of coercion intended to force the state to change
particular policies, ideologies or even governments. The international community often
labels these states as "rogues" or "pariahs". In today's world these labels generally come
along with institutionalized punishments such as sanctions and embargos.
For the purpose of this dataset, states under trade embargos or sanctions from a
single state (for example, the 1962 US embargo on Cuba) were not included since they
were still able to pursue regular economic and diplomatic relations with the majority of the
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world. In order to be considered a full pariah state, the target must have been subject to UN
sanctions or separate sanctions from at least two major powers, not issued in conjunction
with one another.
State Collapse
My coding for state collapse began by referencing the Political Instability Task Force
(PITF) Historical State Armed Conflicts and Regime Crises, 1955 - 2009 dataset.30 I
combined this with outside research to add and subtract cases based on relevance to the
dataset.
For the purpose of this dataset, I define state collapse as a temporary failure of
central authority that is not immediately restored or replaced. A failure of central authority
is characterized by the inability of a state to perform its essential functions of governance,
stability maintenance and economic participation. I use the word temporary in my
definition because those states that cannot recover from a collapse and do truly fail or
dissolve are irrelevant to this dataset. In order for a state to pursue status adjustment
following a collapse, it must retain its identity.
I did not include all cases from the PITF dataset in my final table. The reasons most
cases were excluded is either because they resulted in dissolution of the state - such as the
case of Yugoslavia -they were cases of regime change rather than true state collapse or
because they occurred in states that already had extremely low status prior to collapsing.
The third reason is the main factor leading to the scarcity of state collapse events in the
dataset. Generally states with very high status do not suffer collapse because they have
strong allies and leverage in the international system that can be used to protect the state.
In cases of state collapse the loss of prestige is seen in the dissolution of important
political and economic relationships and removal of the state from international affairs.
The material capability of the state may remain intact after the government recovers, but
30 Gleditsch et al, "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009."
its legitimacy and respect will have been severely damaged, hurting its ability to participate
in international affairs and achieve its goals on a global scale.
Other
My dataset only includes two cases coded as "other" event types - Iran in 1979 and
Taiwan. These are coded as such because they did not fit neatly into any of the other
categories.
Iran experienced a major drop in prestige following the 1979 Revolution. It lost
many allies, was publicly berated and was removed from many of its former political
alliances. It cannot be classified with the other instances of revolution under state collapse,
though, because the government of Iran never failed. The transition of power was relatively
peaceful and stable, but still resulted in a major drop in prestige.
Taiwan is unique in that it is a case of recognition, or lack thereof. Taiwan has been
excluded from participation in all major international bodies - including the United
Nations, World Bank, IMF, etc. - since it is not formally recognized by the Security Council,
but it possesses a fully functioning government and society. Some states, including the
United States, have recognized Taiwan's right to sovereignty, but it is still unable to
function on an international scale or have an opinion on matters directly related to its
wellbeing and security.
Path
The variable Path refers to the route taken by a state's leadership to increase its
prestige. There are four main paths that can be taken: War, Economic, Political and Nuclear.
For the sake of simplicity the dataset is only coded with the first path a state chose. It does
not reflect changes in path made over time. This unfortunately makes status appear to be a
very static concept when it is actually something that is constantly changing over time. If a
state is unsuccessful at its chosen path or believes it has gained all it can from that path it
may change its approach to status adjustment. The same may occur if there is a large shift
in international norms related to one of the four paths as well.
The four paths will be expanded on in great detail in the next chapter and will not be
explained here. The other two options - None and Superseded by another event - deserve a
bit of discussion, though.
None
On rare occasion a leader may not take any steps toward status adjustment. This is
usually the case if he is preoccupied with other situations such as avoiding state collapse,
revolution or economic turmoil. In most cases, items coded as None have happened very
recently and the leader has not yet chosen or made known which path he will take toward
adjustment. In nearly all cases the leader will chose one of the four paths, but it may take
years before he is able to do so and, in the meantime, would be coded as null.
Superseded
In some cases a state suffered a drop in status but before the leadership could take
action toward increasing its prestige the state suffered a second drop or an unexpected
victory - such as being invaded or successfully fighting off an invasion. In these cases, the
first event was superseded by either a more serious drop or an increase in prestige without
the leader having taken direct action. If the state suffered two drops in prestige the path of
status adjustment taken after the second drop would be aimed at fixing the first loss as
well.
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CHAPTER 3: STATUS CHANGE
I. Introduction
States that suffer a dramatic and abrupt drop in prestige must seek ways to increase
their status or else risk permanently losing their position in the international system. Most
leaders believe that their state deserves to be respected and have a say in its own affair.
They make take drastic measures to increase their state's reputation if they feel that this
right has been violated.
The process of status change can be viewed as a trajectory between three points in
time, designated T1, T2, and T3. Ti is the point in time at which the state leader first decides
to pursue status adjustment. T2 is defined as the period of time immediately following the
status-changing decision. This is an interim period of time in which the state is able to see
whether or not it is on the path to achieving its goal. At T2 the leader can choose to either
change paths or continue further down the chosen path. T3, which may occur months or
years down the line, is the point at which status adjustment finally appears. It should not be
viewed as an endpoint, though. A state can continue to increase its status past T3
indefinitely. In some cases T3 may also result in a second change of path if the state still has
not achieved its desired level of prestige.
Ti (Decision Point) T2 (Post-decision) TA (Status Goal
High High High
Average Average Average
Low Low Low
Very Low Very Low Very Low
Fgure 1: The Timeline ofStatus Adjustment
For some states T1 may occur immediately following their drop in prestige. For
others it may take years after a traumatic event before they are able to even begin thinking
about status adjustment. This is particularly true in the case of collapsed states, which may
not be capable of pursuing any sort of foreign policy during the rebuilding process. It may
take years for a failed state to develop the institutions needed for status adjustment and to
become stable enough domestically to look toward the future.
I. Paths of Status Elevation
There are many paths a state can take toward temporary status change. States make
prestige-enhancing decisions on an almost daily basis by signing trade agreements, joining
international organizations, promoting new foreign policies and gaining or losing allies. In
order to institute a permanent and lasting change, though, a more dramatic step is needed.
When a state suffers a dramatic loss in prestige, small steps will do very little to
return it to its former glory. It is much easier to lose status than it is to gain it back. Only a
dramatic long-term adjustment will help a state recover its lost prestige. The paths that can
lead to status recovery can be grouped into four general categories: (1) winning a war, (2)
becoming an economic power, (3) taking the lead on a major political negotiation and (4)
pursuing nuclear weapons.
Which path a state will take depends on many factors including its resources, goals
and constraints on its decision-making. Foreign policy is a poliheuristic game in which a
leader must first eliminate all paths that he considers unacceptable and then evaluate
between the remaining choices. Leaders must make compromises between their foreign
policy goals - in this case, achieving prestige- and the institutional constraints placed on
them by their domestic population.31
All four paths produce different rates and levels of status adjustment. Most have
additional benefits that increase the economic, military or political security of the state and
31 Goertz, "Constraints, Compromises, and Decision Making."
all have major costs and obstacles on the road to success. The costs and benefit of each path
are not static over time, but change along with international norms.
In the past seventy years all four paths have experienced different highs and lows in
popularity. The 1950s were a time where nuclear power was revered and respected. Many
states attempted to follow the nuclear path, but very few succeeded. Today nuclear
proliferation is considered a rogue path, only taken by those states that are already
positioned well outside international society.
The path of war seems to have fallen along the wayside as well. Improvements in
weapons technology, the advent of guerilla warfare and the rise of non-state actors have
made war a much less appealing path than it was in the first half of the twentieth century.
Since the turn of the twentieth century the incidences of interstate war have dropped from
0.744 wars per member of the international system to 0.171 wars per member in the late
1990s. 32
There seems to have been a shift in recent decades toward more peaceful
approaches to international affairs, such as the political or economic paths. As international
opinions and norms change over time, so does the appeal of each path to status adjustment.
The last path, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, is the most understudied and
controversial of the four. For this reason it will receive the most attention in this chapter.
All four paths warrant discussion, though, in order to better understand the costs and
potential benefits of each.
Winning a War
The most intuitive response to a status drop, especially one resulting from a major
military defeat, is to fight another war and win. This is much easier said than done.
32 Wayman et. al., "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars."
The main requirement of this path is a strong and capable army. Following a major
military defeat a state must be able to rebuild its forces - people, vehicles, weapons, etc. -
before waging a second war. This requires a large number of personnel, major
expenditures and a quick recovery in the defense industry. Many states cannot pull
together such resources following a period of isolation, a military defeat or an incident of
state collapse and may shy away from choosing the military option.
The second requirement of this path is the identification of an enemy and the
justification for fighting a new war so soon after completing one. In most cases leaders will
attempt to justify the war as retaliation against the enemy responsible for the original drop
in prestige - if there is one. A war could also be fought against a different - and hopefully
weaker - force, though, if the leaders believe such a victory would be easier to achieve.
The path of military retaliation is not simply a matter of deciding you want a war
and fighting one. There are domestic and international pressures which constrain a leader's
ability to turn to violence. The leader must convince his people that it is in their best
interest to wage a war while they are still recovering from losing family, friends, jobs
and/or property in the previous event. he must also be able to convince the people that
they will win and are not meet with an unnecessary, tragic end.
' Internationally, waging a war without just cause is considered a criminal action. A
state must prove that the conflict was a matter of sovereignty, self-defense, or protection of
its people or else risk setting off a global backlash. 33 Indiscriminately starting a new war
runs the risk of getting the international community involved against the state, further
decreasing their chances of victory. It also runs the risk of leading to isolation by
presenting the state as a hostile "rogue" that is threatening the stability of the international
system. This brand would not only fail to increase the status of the state, but may even push
it further down the status scale and create a whole other obstacle that must be overcome.
33 A good in-depth explanation of just war theory can be found in Walzer,Just and Unjust
Wars.
By its very nature war is an unpredictable phenomenon. Even when one state has
superior resources and capabilities it may ultimately lose. Waging a war to increase status
is hardly a guarantee of victory. There is no way for a state to be certain if it allies or allies
of the target state will participate in the violence. There is also no way to guarantee that if
victory is achieved it will not just lead to another war. Waging wars to increase status can
lead to an indefinite cycle of violence with the losing side always fighting back in
retaliation.
If victory can be achieved, though, winning a war is a one of the quickest and
clearest ways to increase state status. In most cases of war there is a clear victor and a clear
loser. There is little debate about the success of the operation both at home and abroad.
Victory helps erase the memory of the previous status loss both internationally and
domestically. It will increase the prestige of the state by proving that it is a winner and may
increase its safety by proving to others that it has the capability to win a war and should
not be seen as an easy enemy to defeat.
Military victory gives a state a position of regional importance that will help cement
its continued involvement in international and affairs. It captures the attention of both the
state's neighbors and the world's superpowers and proves that it can be an important
player on a global scale. Whether the victorious state gained territory as a result of its
triumph or suffered dramatic losses in the fighting does not matter too much in the grand
scheme of things. A victory will have positive results even if it does not lead to major gains
of material power as well.
Wars are a great way to rally a domestic population, especially if there are strong
divisions or unrest. The presence of a third party "other" is often powerful enough to unite
domestic groups that were formerly in conflict. It solidifies the feeling of nationalism and
ethnic pride that citizens feel and encourages them to express support for their state and
government. This helps increase the state's stability and ensure the popularity of the
leadership.
When a state is victorious in a war it is often able to take the lead on the peace
negotiations - if they take place - and form a settlement that is tilted heavily in its favor.
This settlement helps increase the status of the victor while simultaneously decreasing the
prestige of the losing state. It can also provide the victor with important territory, political
concessions or other resources depending on how the conflict ended.
Military victories may have the highest impact on a state's status at T2 out of any
path, but may not have a very large impact - or may even result in a negative movement -
from there to T3.
Economic Power
The decision to use economic advancement to increase status is generally taken by
those states that have a strong industrial sector and a large trading base for exports. For
states that are isolated from the international community, the economic avenue is rarely a
viable approach to status increase.
In order to maintain the amount of production needed to become a major economic
power, the state must have a strong domestic base either in industry, natural resources or
commodities. The products must be in demand from other states and not be something
every state can produce. The more exclusive and complicated the state's products are and
the larger the amount that can be produced, the greater the benefit will be of pursuing
economic paths to status adjustment.
The main benefit of the economic path outside of status adjustment is largely self-
explanatory: it augments the economy of the rising nation. Increasing industrial production
and exports will bring in more capital, create more jobs and increase the wealth of the state
and many of its people. This may also lead to domestic political benefits for the leader who
is in power when this production starts to turn the economy around.
The new relationships developed through exports may also strengthen political
and/or military alliances abroad. The further intertwined two states become in the
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economic sector, the more they are willing to work together on a host of other important
issues. Developing economic power can have far reaching benefits in many aspects of
international relations.
As with any major decision taken by a state, there may be negative results and costs
that come along with economic expansion. If the state does not already have the industry in
place to support an export-oriented economy it will have to institute dramatic structural
changes, which may be unpopular with certain sectors of the economy. As with any major
political decision, there are institutional constraints on a leader's ability to make changes to
the state economy. He must contend with the bureaucratic and organizational structures
currently in place and force changes in them without permanently harmin his ability to
govern in the domestic realm.
Even if the economic structure of the state is legally changed, there is no way to
ensure that the more informal, cultural forms of interaction will change as well. These are
much further ingrained in the people of the state and may counteract any attempts at
jumpstarting an export capability.34 There is always the possibility that the state will fail at
producing any good worthwhile to the international community and will find itself unable
to compete in the global market at the level needed for status adjustment.
Without the proper trade agreements in place, very little can come of industrial
production, even on a large scale. For this reason, states looking to increase their status
through economics must have good political relationships with at least a few major powers
or be able to develop these relationships. Building the industry is only one half of the battle;
getting the goods to move throughout the world is just as important and often more
difficult. For some states, having a worldwide export market will require major political
concessions, sometimes on issues that the leaders or people do not want to give in to.
34 Child & Yuan illustrate how institutional constraints play a role in economic decision
making by examining they role they playing in the development of the Chinese investment
section; Child & Yuan, Institutional Constraints on Economic Reform.
These issues may need to be sacrificed in the short term, though, in order to achieve the
long term benefits.
In the long term (T3) pursuing economic power may move a state from the very
bottom of the status scale to a place almost near the top. It will help it form connections
with many different states, including some of the world's major powers. As the state's
economy becomes more intertwined with others it will find itself in a better position for
international bargaining and negotiations. It may become the go-to state for major
economic agreements as it earns the reputation for being a modern, advanced nation
capable of helping the world achieve similar levels of progress.
This position of economic prestige is always in danger of a crash, though. If for some
reason - be it a natural disaster, a military attack, a change in leadership or some other
unforeseen event - a state is unable to continue production of its main commodities or
maintain its trade relationships, all the benefits of increased economic status are in danger
of being lost.
Increased economic status also does not protect states from future attacks or losses.
The state generally does not gain any new military or defensive capabilities by pursuing
economic power and at some point in the future may find itself in a situation where it is
once again losing a war and sliding down the status rankings.
Political Negotiation
The third avenue a state can take to increase its status is that of political
negotiations. This path should not be confused with the daily diplomacy of states, but it
does begin in the same place - foreign policy.
The political path of status adjustment requires a state to insert itself as the focal
point of a major political negotiation. This can either be as a broker in an important peace
agreement, the host of an international summit on a specific transnational issue or the
initiator of a major transnational policy. The issue that the state decides to take a stand on
will largely depend on its particular resources and policy agenda. It could be anything from
deforestation to the Arab-Israeli conflict to nuclear weapons control. The more important
the issue is globally, the higher the potential for an increase in prestige.
The largest obstacle to this path is the initial drive to be seen as the leader on a
particular topic. A state that has just suffered a great drop in status is unlikely to foster
confidence in its ability to lead multilateral negotiations unless it is first able to garner
support from a few other states or at least one major power. Gathering this support will be
difficult since the state has just lost a large amount of respect and legitimacy. It will most
likely need to take small steps toward bilateral negotiations before it can set itself up as a
global leader. The amount of support needed will vary with the sensitivity of the issue in
question.
Often, gaining this support requires the state to make concessions of previous issues
or demands. The more a state is able to offer, the better chance it has to bring other states
to the table and gain their favor. At the same time, though, leaders must be careful not to
give away so much that they are seen to be abandoning the demands and desires of their
domestic population. A leader cannot offer something his people are unwilling to give up
without facing the consequences. 35
Whether the political path is a summit, peace process or other negotiation, serving
as the host on an issue will set the state up to play an important role in further negotiations
on the same point. Even if future meetings are not held at the same location, the state has
gotten their foot in the door and should be included in all future meetings. It has set itself
up with a niche in international affairs on which it is considered an expert. Its opinions will
be heard and it will be one step closer to having its goals met in other foreign policy arenas.
Taking a political path to status adjustment will also help a state develop a
reputation for being peaceful and conscientious. Most transnational issues are matters of
3s This is because politics is a two-level game in which the leader is the only person able to
play at both tables. Putnam, "Two Level Games"
peace, weapons reduction, health or climate. Supporting these issues is usually a non-
threatening stance that is unlikely to foster hostility or mistrust like some of the other
paths. It may also be the basis for new alliances or accords to form bilaterally on related
issues.
The utility of peaceful negotiations for prestige increase is called into question,
though, if an accord cannot be reached. There is always the question of whether the host
state will be criticized for such an outcome or praised for trying anyway. Also, if an accord
fails, the host state may not be invited to further negotiations if it is blamed for the lack of
results.
This path requires the least amount of resources, economically and militarily, of any
path and may therefore be considered the easiest, but it also has the lowest status
potential. While hosting negotiations may help a state recover from being at the bottom of
the status rung, it is unlikely that it will raise it all the way to a position of high status, even
in the long term. Many states are content to sit at the middle of the status spectrum, though,
and others may see political negotiations as simply the first step in increasing their status.
They may make a secondary decision at T2 with their newly cemented political ties that
allows them to see a further status increase at T3.
Nuclear Weapons
The final avenue for states to increase their prestige is the newest, most
controversial and, consequently, the most understudied. That is the pursuit of nuclear
weapons.
The numbers of risks and obstacles associated with nuclear proliferation has kept
most scholars from viewing it as a means of achieving status. Realist beliefs of rationality
are stretched by the argument that states are willing to face the almost insurmountable
odds of pursuing a nuclear program in order to achieve a higher degree of prestige. This is
why nuclear proliferation is most often discussed as a matter of augmenting state security.
The security story, though, falls short of explaining some cases.
A nuclear arsenal is a powerful force that requires substantial capital, technology
and modernization. It signals to others that the state has all of these elements as well as the
strength granted to it by such a destructive weapon. Nuclear states play an important role
in the international system and are among those states with the highest level of status. For
this reason, some states may see the pursuit of nuclear weapons as a clear path toward
status adjustment.
Since the nuclear path is the least studied of the four I will examine it in further
detail below in order to better illustrate my theory of status adjustment.
III. Nuclear Weapons and Prestige
Obstacles to Proliferation
Nuclear weapons have been studied in great detail by international relations
scholars since they were first conceived of in 1939. They are rarely examined as tools of
status adjustment, though. Scholars look at the technical aspects of nuclear arsenals, the
potential ramifications of proliferation and the security implications of the decision to go
nuclear. The motivations for nuclear proliferation, especially of a non-strategic kind are
largely unstudied.
I argue that nuclear weapons are a viable means of status adjustment and have been
used by a handful of states in recent years as such. While the security concerns leading to
proliferations are important, they are not the whole store. Prestige plays an important role
in the decision to go nuclear and may be an even more powerful motivator than security in
some cases.
Not every state that has pursued nuclear weapons was facing obvious security
threats at the time. Some states have actually put themselves in a position of decreased
security for years while trying to develop their first bomb. Any state pursuing nuclear
weapons will inevitably face a series of obstacles and objections that make it difficult to
succeed. It may become a target of isolationist policies or even a preemptive attack. The
window of vulnerability for such policies may last anywhere from a few years to a few
decades depending on how long it takes to create a fully operational nuclear weapon. It is
nearly impossible for a state to know beforehand just how long it will take to achieve
nuclear status.
The first major obstacle states must overcome in the pursuit of nuclear weapons is
actually building the weapon itself. Building a nuclear weapons program requires a large
amount of human and financial capital that many states do not have. The technology must
either be produced at home or bought for a high price abroad, usually through black
market channels. States with disheveled economies and limited funds cannot pursue a
nuclear program without further burdening their resources. Even if they are able to
develop nuclear technology, the material is useless without the correct human capital.
A large scientific and engineering base is needed to run the nuclear facilities, build
the weapons and make sure the operation functions correctly and efficiently. Without a
prior domestic nuclear establishment, this knowledge can only be gained by sending
scholars abroad or importing knowledge from other nuclear organizations. This requires
the state to let many promising minds leave the country or rely on another state's
willingness to export their own nuclear knowledge.
The second obstacle to nuclear proliferation is the global non-proliferation regime
that has emerged in recent decades. Pursuit of nuclear weapons used to be considered
"(normal" in the 1950s and 1960s, but today it is branded as a "rogue" action, taken only by
outliers.36 Openly pursuing nuclear weapons results in alienation by those states
committed to the non-proliferation regime. It makes the state the target of negative
rhetoric, sanctions and potential isolation.
36 JimWalsh argues that the Nonproliferation regime, while often criticized for its faults,
has actually been quite successful. The severity with which the global opinion of nuclear
proliferation has shifted from positive to negative in recent years is one of the strongest
examples of the NPT's success; Walsh, "Learning from Past Success."
Trade, economic assistance, diplomacy and protection agreements are all put in
jeopardy by proliferation. States pursuing nuclear weapons may lose major trading
partners and sever any protection alliances they participate in. They may face severe
economic hardships resulting from the costs of the nuclear program and the loss of trade.
They will also suffer political backlash both at home and abroad. This is why most nuclear
programs are begun in secret, adding another layer of difficulty to acquiring the necessary
materials and knowledge.
The threat of sanctions and isolation may not be seen as a major impediment to
states that are already at the bottom level of status and currently suffering from isolation.
This is why many of the states that have pursued nuclear weapons in recent years did so
only after they had been excluded from a large portion of their political ties. The third
obstacle, though - threat of military actions - remains important for even the most secluded
states.
The United States has demonstrated its willingness to pursue military action against
potential proliferators and other states have pledged to do the same. Given the amount of
time it takes to develop a fully functional nuclear weapons program, the window for such
retaliation can be quite large. The threat of attack does not just come from major powers
either. A hostile neighbor or rival may also be compelled to initiate an attack on a state it
knows is pursuing nuclear power in order to cut off production before it can become a
threat.
The fourth obstacle is the issue of proliferation cascades. The threat of a nuclear
rival may motivate neighboring states to pursue their own nuclear programs rather than
risk becoming a subservient power. If those other states have a larger technology or
knowledge base to draw from they may even beat the initial proliferator to completion. A
nuclear cascade could cost a state billions of dollars by creating an arms race and leave it in
the same strategic position or even worse off than it was before making those
expenditures.
Finally, leaders must always consider their domestic population when making major
strategic decisions. Every state leader rules in a two level game. They are an actor in the
international realm, but also an agent of their people.37 The leader is generally the only
person who participates in both levels of negotiation and, therefore, is the only person who
can be held accountable by both the people and the international community.
Some populations will accept a nuclear weapon with open arms, proclaiming it as a
right of the people. These actors most often include the nuclear energy establishment, parts
of the professional military and politicians whose constituents benefit from a nuclear
program. 38 Such support may be more widespread if the state has faced a history of
hostility by another power, especially a nuclear one. Iranian leaders have been very
successful in this arena and have managed to rally an otherwise divided population around
the state's notorious nuclear program. They have now made the pursuit of nuclear power
synonymous with the Iranian national identity and state sovereignty.
Some populations, on the other hand, may feel that they have lived without
interference from the international community and pursuing nuclear weapons threatens
their state's survival and stability. These people would not rally around the idea of
increasing their state's military power, but protest such an action as endangering their way
of life. A leader that pursues nuclear power must understand the mindset of his people.
Whatever decision he makes, a state leader must be prepared to face the
consequences of a negative outcome. The people of a state rarely differentiate between
unfavorable results caused by unforeseeable events and the bad outcome of a political
37A negotiator and/or leader must come to the table of international negotiations and
decision making with a "win set" of conditions based on his domestic population. The
decision to go nuclear may not be an international decision, but it affects the international
system and therefore should be considered a two-level game even though the decision
making process is occurring entirely in the domestic bureaucracy; Putnam, "Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics."
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decision, whether or not the decision had popular support.39 As recent events in the Middle
East have proven, the power of the people cannot be overlooked by leaders, even those
who do not need popular support for democratic elections.
All of these risk factors can be difficult to quantify, leading most states to err on the
side of caution. As Jacques Hymans explains in his psychological political work, "if you
cannot calculate the risks involved, you cannot determine if you are willing to accept
them."40 Why, then, would states pursue nuclear weapons programs when facing an
unknown realm of bankruptcy, alienation, political upheaval and retaliation? If the answer
cannot be found by examining the security realm it must lie somewhere else. This is where
the prestige effects of nuclear weapons come to light.
Proliferation and Prestige
The creation of a successful nuclear weapons program by a state signals the
development of military and technological improvements that only a few other states in the
world are capable of achieving. It proves that the state can be a major player in the modern
world and forces others to take notice of its advancements and capabilities. This helps the
state increase its attained level of status and, once the nuclear program is institutionalized,
would increase the base level of the state's ascribed status as well.
The nuclear states of the world are a very small, but extremely powerful group.
There are only nine nuclear powers, but they hold a majority of the world's power - all five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are nuclear states. Engaging
with these states on a regular basis would dramatically increase a state's centrality and
signal to the rest of the world that it is a state worth knowing.
39 Downs, "Optimal Imperfection?", 132; Because of this "the constituency is forced to
remove effective but unlucky executives who made the best possible decision in a difficult
case." This is especially relevant when dealing with situations of uncertainty. Downs and
Rocke are mostly discussing the decision to go to war when making this statement, but the
decision to build nuclear weapons may result in similar consequences if retaliation ensues.
Therefore, the possibility of the "unforeseen" consequences must always be considered.
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The United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, Pakistan and India
have all turned their nuclear programs into essential elements of their state's prestige.
Others cannot engage in dealings with these states without viewing them as nuclear
powers and treating them as such. This makes others more cautious when negotiating on
issues that could lead to military conflict, more willing to depend on these states for
protection and more willing to act subservient in political disagreements.
Israel and North Korea, on the other hand, are still trying to attain this level of
nuclear status. They are accepted as nuclear powers, but are not received with the same
reverence as the other seven. Whether this is because their nuclear programs are relatively
new, still largely secret and unconfirmed or because their arsenals are so small is
uncertain. There is no finite line for when a nuclear program switches from an attained to
an ascribed measure of status, but it is signaled by changes in the behavior of states around
it. The constant threats and attacks on Israel and the large-scale sanctions and political
disapproval of North Korea show that they have not yet raised themselves to higher status
positions.
Joining the "nuclear club" helps a state achieve ascribed status because it showcases
a permanent change in its capabilities and proves that is has a highly advanced level of
knowledge and technology. It does not lead to immediate recognition, though. In today's
world, the pursuit of nuclear power is far more likely to garner negative attention than
positive since it is seen as a violation of international norms. For a state that is
marginalized and ignored, though, negative attention may be better than no attention at all.
It is the first step on the path to recognition and may provide the state with a platform for
changing and increasing public opinion about itself.
The road from nuclear power to prestige is not fast or smooth as evidenced by the
isolation of North Korea and Iran. Pursuing nuclear power in today's world requires a state
to break away from or openly violate a major international treaty. Such an action will likely
result in criticism, sanctions and even threats, but it will also help keep the state in the
public eye as nuclear states can hardly be ignored. After a period of waiting the state's
nuclear arsenal may be accepted by the international community and grant it an
unprecedented level of prestige.
India, a nuclear state, has been criticized for years for refusing to sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and participate in the non-proliferation regime. In the past
year, though, it has received almost unanimous support among United Nations Security
Council members for its bid to become the newest permanent member of the UNSC - China
is the only state that has refused to give its endorsement. 41
While supporting India's candidacy is a long way from actually voting for its seat, it
is still a gesture with large symbolic significance, especially since the United States has not
made the same endorsement for long-term allies Germany and Japan, non-nuclear powers
who are also seeking a bid.42 New nuclear states may view the status of India as a sign that
the stigma of nuclear proliferation dissipates over time and, with enough patience, may ally
you with the most important and prestigious nations of the world.
Benefits of the Proliferation Path
At the end of its path to proliferation a state will not only have increased its status,
but will possess the most destructive weapon on earth and the power to backup its newly
deserved reputation. Even the most unwilling rivals must recognize the results of a
successful nuclear program and exercise caution in dealing with nuclear states.
Unlike the other three paths of status adjustment, it is unlikely that the prestige
increase resulting from nuclear possession will be lost or taken away. Unless a state
voluntarily gives up its nuclear weapons, there is very little chance that they will be lost. To
this day, no state has ever had a full operation nuclear arsenal removed from its soil against
its will.
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For states that are able to overcome all the obstacles and actually build a nuclear
arsenal, proliferation may also serve the vital purpose of restoring legitimacy and uniting a
bloodied, divided population. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program had a long and storied
history, but became formally institutionalized following its 1971 civil war.4 3 India
maintained a purposely-ambiguous posture toward its nuclear program for many years
that was only ended when a new Hindu nationalist government came to power in 1998.44
The rallying power of nuclear weapons has been seen for decades and there is no reason to
believe new nuclear nations will not experience the same wave of nationalistic support.
Pursuing nuclear weapons is one of the slowest paths to achieving status
adjustment, but it may be the most effective and most permanent. Even if a state is
subjected to sanctions and isolation, it is likely that it will rise from "very low" status to
"low" or "mid" status almost immediately after becoming a nuclear power. It will be invited
to international negotiations to discuss its nuclear program and be approached with
greater respect by rivals and neighbors.
Once a state is able to overcome the opposition that is likely to result from its new
capabilities, it will become an active participant in negotiations on global nuclear issues
and may even be included in other major political or economic discussions. It may be
invited to hold a position of importance in international organizations or achieve regional
hegemony and the support of formerly hostile or indifferent neighbors.
Becoming a nuclear power has the potential to transform a state from the bottom
rung of status to the world of super powers, a level that other paths of status adjustment
rarely, if ever, reach. It is not a quick or easy path to take, though, which is why there are
still so few nuclear states to date.
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CHAPTER 4: A SMALL SURVEY OF CASES
I. Case Selection
This thesis uses five cases - two large and three small - to illustrate the theories
presented in the first three chapters. These cases were strategically chosen from the
dataset in chapter 2 to represent a diverse and, hopefully, complete picture of the theory in
action.
The five cases collectively showcase all four paths of status adjustment in action,
with carrying degrees of success. They demonstrate cases, such as Japan, that were wildly
successful and others, such as Iran, that have still not achieved their goals. They also
represent states that suffered from a single drop in prestige and states that have fallen on
more than one occasion. Any number of cases could have done this, though.
What makes these five cases work so well together is that they include temporal,
cultural, geographical, political and religious variations. Taken together these five cases
show that there is no single "type" represented by this theory and no singular model of how
status adjustment occurs.
The cases chosen represent three different continents, both secular and religious
states, multiple forms of government and vastly different cultural and historical
backgrounds. Above all, though, they represent different eras in the world of international
relations. There are cases that take place in the post war world of the 1950s and 1960s,
cases which exist at the height of the Cold War and those which persist beyond the fall of
the Soviet Union. These cases span dramatic shifts in international norms such as the shift
from a world where nuclear power was in vogue to one where the NPT has created an anti-
nuclear club. They represent the changing face of global fear from the threat of the evil,
savage Japanese to the all-encompassing battle against communism and today's fight
against radical Islam.
Collectively, these cases present the most accurate picture of how status can change
across time and across cultures in the international system. Some cases begin and end in a
matter of decades while others have been changing and growing for nearly fifty years.
These cases clearly indicate that some states are able to select a single path and stick with
it until they have achieved their desired level of prestige while others will change tactics
multiple times, trying to find the right fit.
The diversity and complexity of these cases helps represent the inherent difficulty of
defining and tracking a concept as ethereal as prestige while still providing a relatively
complete picture of my theory in action.
II. Introduction to the Smaller Case Surveys
The three small-scale cases in this paper were chosen to compliment and contrast
with one another. They represent vastly different approaches to status adjustment with
varying degrees of success. Taken together they help operationalize the concept of prestige
and illustrate it in a way that can be better understood in the larger, more in-depth case
studies.
The first case in this chapter, Pakistan, may be the single most studied case of
nuclear proliferation and the most over determined one, as well. The clear security risks
Pakistan faced from India were obviously an important consideration in the decision to go
nuclear, but that does not mean that prestige did not play a role as well. A demoralized and
embarrassed nation, seemingly incapable of winning any war, needed a way to prove to its
people and the world that it could match India in at least one area of technology and power.
Pakistan's nuclear program has forced the world to pay attention to the state in a way they
would not have if it were still a conventional power.
The second case is that of Japan. It takes little convincing to prove that Japan
experienced one of history's most miraculous economic turnarounds following World War
II. But how did the drive for prestige play a role? Following a major military defeat and the
loss of its empire Japan had to find a place for itself in the international system. It was being
belittled as inferior in matters of technology and production and had to prove that it was a
modern, advanced nation in order to gain the respect of the international community.
The final case in this chapter, France, is another instance of nuclear proliferation
but, unlike Pakistan, is one where prestige motivations have been studied in detail. This
case is not just an illustration of the decision to go nuclear, though. It shows how states
have to stick to their chosen paths for decades or risk losing the status they have gained
when they face further military or political losses.
These three cases are all very well known and have been studied in great detail.
However they are rarely, with the possible exception of France, presented as models of
status adjustment and the quest for prestige. They are almost never viewed as examples of
one singular concept even though they work quite well together. By systematically tracking
the fall and recovery of these three states I hope to illustrate the specifics of how status
change operates and how many different routes there are to prestige, even within the four
main pathways.
III. Pakistan's Shift from War to Proliferation
The entire history of modern Pakistan is a series of political and military losses to
India. Whether on the battlefield, at the United Nations or in bilateral negotiations, Pakistan
has been treated as the lesser of the two states ever since its creation in 1947. This has
forced Pakistan to take up the position of the revisionist state, always seeking to change the
status quo and rewrite its recent history.
When India began pursuing nuclear power in the second half of the century Pakistan
had no choice but to follow suit. As it suffered loss after loss to India it became apparent
that the race for nuclear power might be the only opportunity for it to match India, prove
that it is worth recognition and finally be able to shape the region into the model it always
wanted.
Pakistan's decision to go nuclear may have been the most over-determined
proliferation decision any state has ever made. It had a clear rival and hostile neighbor that
was already pursuing nuclear power, it was suffering from inner turmoil that it needed to
repress and it had a rapidly diminishing conventional force suffering loss after loss in
battle. One aspect of the decision to go nuclear that is often overlooked, though, is the effect
it had on Pakistan's identity and prestige.
Identity in Pakistan
Pakistan was born into an identity crisis. It was founded in the name of Islam and as
a way to give the Muslims of South Asia their own state, yet it has struggled to be seen as a
modern, important nation. Pakistani leaders have used their identity as the only state
formed directly in the name of Islam to garner popular support, but in doing so have largely
overlooked the need to form a Pakistani identity unique to the state itself. This void has
given rise to many national and transnational Jihad movements within Pakistan's borders.
Pakistan has spent its entire history searching for a way to live up to its promises of
being a Muslim state while still being seen as modern. Throughout most of the world the
vision of "modernity" has come to be seen as synonymous with secularism. 45 Religious
states are portrayed as backward, old-fashioned and often repressive. These images give
little consideration given to the fact that Islam is different than Christianity, though, and
that the governing styles of the two religions are not the same. In the Muslim world, in fact,
secularism has often led to authoritarian, tyrannical rule.
Pakistan has failed to convince its people that Islamic rule will lead them to glory
and greatness. This has resulted in widespread civil unrest as different groups compete for
power and influence. The one issue that unites all Pakistani people, though, is their
opposition to India. As one Pakistani journalist wrote "we discover that regardless of the
4s Butt, "Pakistan's Salvation."
age factor, every individual around loves to hate our neighboring country with a
vengeance...The fervor and devotion tantamounts to religious zeal."4 6
A hatred of India is the one major defining characteristic of all Pakistani people. It
has so permeated the culture that the Pakistani identity has become synonymous with
simply being anti-India. This vague, conditional definition has failed to fill the identity void
in Pakistan and has made nationalism contingent on the state's success or failure at dealing
with its hostile neighbor.
Pakistan's Fall: Always Second Best
Pakistan was born out of the British partition of India in 1947. The British had spent
years trying to reconcile the religious and ethnic fighting flaring up in the territory, but by
the mid-1940s had realized it was a lost cause. They decided that dividing up the territory
on religious lines would help decrease tensions and allow the two groups to live in peace.47
The most difficult area to partition - and the territory that remains one of the main
sources of tension between India and Pakistan today - was the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. As a majority Muslim area under Hindu rule, the Kashmir Valley did not fit neatly
into either of the newly created territories. It was given the freedom to decide which side it
would cede with during the breakup - being made its own independent nation was never
an option. The leaders of Pakistan had assume that, since the territory was 77% Muslim, it
would cede to their side without discussion.48 Two months after the split, though, Kashmir
still had not made a decision.
In an attempt to scare the Maharaja into accession, Pakistan launched a military
offensive into Kashmir, claiming that it was coming to the aid of a repressed people. The
attack succeeded in frightening the leader, but not to the desired ends. Instead of joining
the Union of Pakistan, the Maharaja asked Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General of
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India, for support. He responded by sending troops into Kashmir, driving the Pakistanis out
of the majority of occupied territory.
As the fighting approached a stalemate, Indian leaders appealed to the United
Nations Security Council to negotiate a ceasefire agreement, making it one of the first major
issues the newly formed international body had to deal with. India appealed on the
grounds that it had legal rights to the territory under the Instrument of Accession it had
signed with Kashmir in 1947. Pakistan countered by saying that the agreement was illegal
because the Maharaja had negotiated an agreement with them a month earlier, which
barred him from negotiating with other states.49
India believed that it was a superior and, therefore, more credible state and would
have better luck governing the territory of Kashmir. It claimed that Pakistan was
threatening the stability of the Middle East and only by removing all Pakistani troops from
the region and securing its borders against further conflict could they ever hope to achieve
peace in the region.50 The Security Council heard arguments from both sides, but decided
largely in favor of India, leaving them with over two-thirds of the Kashmir territory as part
of the ceasefire agreement.51 Pakistan had not only lost the military contest for Kashmir,
but a political one as well.
Since its creation, Pakistan has been labeled as inferior to India and has spent the
rest of its history trying to remove itself from that shadow, with very limited success.
Today India is receiving support from nearly all the great powers to gain a permanent seat
on the United Nations Security Council while Pakistan is considered the state where "all of
the nightmares of the twenty-first century come together."5 2
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Pakistan still has a long way to go to match the prestige of India, but it has had some
success over the years at making itself a constant presence in international affairs, albeit it
for mostly negative reasons. The path mostly responsible for Pakistan's continued presence
is that of nuclear proliferation, but it has attempted status adjustment through war over the
years as well.
The Paths Not Taken
As a relatively new state, with little clout in the international system, Pakistan was
forced to rely on unilateral means - war and proliferation - to improve its state status. It
would have been unable to garner the type of international support base needed to pursue
either and economic or political readjustment, especially while it remained in the shadow
of India.
Political Path
One of the main factors contributing to Pakistan's lack of prestige - in addition to its
multiple war losses - was the way it was treated in international affairs. When the petition
for Kashmir first went to the United Nations, it was decided in favor of India. Pakistan was
forced to remove all armed troops and tribesmen before India even had to draw up a plan
for withdrawing its similar forces. India was given the responsibility of looking over
Kashmir and overseeing the administration of its plebiscite vote.5 3
What had begun as a joint request to decide the fate of Kashmir resulted in a
legalization of India's military presence in the region and a denunciation of Pakistan's
rights. There was little hope that any future attempts at political negotiation would turn out
differently. Any policy proposed by Pakistan would automatically have been opposed by
India, leading to a series of international arguments that would, if history were any
indication, be decided in favor of India. Pursuing political status adjustment would most
likely have been a dead end or a downward slide for Pakistan.
s United Nations Security Council, Resolution 47.
Economic Path
During the 1950s Pakistan's government attempted to shift the large profits being
made by agricultural traders into the more modern industry of manufacturing. It put into
place heavily protectionist policies and set up an economy based on import substitution.
This strategy was intended to increase imports of the raw materials needed for the
manufacturing of consumer goods.
In order to keep its export sector moving at the same time, though, Pakistan's
government offered bonus vouchers to exporters of high-value products. These vouchers
could then be used to pay for imported goods. The vouchers provided no benefit to the
economy, though, and by the 1960s Pakistan's manufacturing industry actually had a
negative value-added. 54
Pakistan's protectionist policies and export subsidies resulted in a severe debt
problem and a shortage of foreign capital that still exists in the state today. It also caused a
narrowing of the export sector and limited the options available for international trade.
Pakistan was never able to achieve the type of industrial base or trade relationships needed
to maintain economic status adjustment.
The First Chosen Path: War
Pakistani leaders believed that their state was incomplete without Kashmir because
there were Muslims there who deserved to live under Islamic rule. s By the 1960s,
Pakistan had gotten fed up with its position as an inferior nation and felt the need to make
a statement on an international scale. Leaders hoped to regain some of the state's lost
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legitimacy and respect. The path chosen by leaders was the one that would have the most
immediate and decisive results: war.
In 1965 the Pakistani government had plans to incite a rebellion in Kashmir by
turning locals into a rebel army. Lightly armed Pakistani troops were sent in on the ground
to find sympathetic locals and organize them into a resistance. Rather than finding support,
though, the Pakistanis were met with opposition. They were turned in to the Indian
authorities by the very citizens they were trying to recruit. 56
Having lost the element of surprise and the assistance of a local rebellion, Pakistani
officials should have called off the attack. They had inferior military capabilities, were
fighting on Indian territory and had a losing record when it came to military conflicts with
India. All of the numbers showed that it would be in the best interest of Pakistan's security
to return home and come up with a new plan. Frustrated at their regional inferiority,
though, they were determined to go through with the attack and launched troops into the
area as scheduled. The offensive was short-lived as Indian troops once again pushed the
Pakistanis back and the UN issued another ceasefire agreement.
The main outcome of the Second Kashmir War was that it fostered a sense of
separatism and dissatisfaction in Western Pakistan. The citizens there felt that they were
being overlooked in favor of Kashmir and they no longer wanted to be associated with the
state of Pakistan.
This dissatisfaction slowly dissolved into conflict and by 1971 Pakistan was embroiled
in an all-out civil war. India wasted no time in supporting the rebel Bengali forces, and
Pakistan responded by increasing its troop presence in the area. The conflict devolved into
yet another bilateral war - the Bangladesh War - and in less that two weeks India emerged
once again as the clear victor.
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Pakistan's troops had been thoroughly routed by Indian forces and thousands of
miles of territory were seized. Western Pakistan became the independent state of
Bangladesh and Pakistan was sent home to lick its wounds and try to find a new approach
to saving its damaged reputation. After this conflict it became clear to President Bhutto and
the rest of Pakistan that their state "cannot go to war. Not in the next 5, 10 or 15 years..."57
This was a far cry from Bhutto's pre-election promise to "take revenge (on Hindu India) so
as to undo the temporary humiliation" and to continue that fight "for a thousand years if
necessary."58
Pakistani leaders had thought they could save their state's reputation by starting
and winning a war. Instead of victory, though, they were met with defeat, which plunged
the state into civil war. Pakistan ended up surrendering a large portion of its territory,
losing three wars to India and being overlooked by the United Nations multiple times
within its first twenty-five years as a sovereign state. If it continued in this direction
indefinitely it would run the risk of becoming a nonentity in global affairs.
A state that can be ignored and pushed aside can easily become obsolete. It will
remain in existence, but have no real influence in the world. Pakistan needed to make a
statement to the world that would get it recognized independent of its conflict with India
and it chose to do so by drawing negative, but almost immediate attention to itself by
starting its own nuclear program.
The Second Path Chosen: Nuclear Proliferation
The Pakistani nuclear program, like most others, began in the early 1950s. By the
mid-1960s it had become militarily focused and researchers' primary task was to study the
practical uses of nuclear power in a wartime setting. The nuclear industry was not
exceptionally large or powerful at this time, though.
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Following Pakistan's defeat in the Bangladesh War the nuclear program was kicked
into high gear. Bhutto met with an elite group of Pakistani scientists on January 20, 1972
and encouraged them to make the formation of a Pakistani nuclear weapon an issue of the
highest priority. 5 9 His decision was an obvious violation of international norms, which had
begun to embrace the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. Pakistan refused to sign on
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and began fostering an image for itself as the "bad seed" of
the nuclear world.
When India launched its first successful nuclear test - a 15kilton peaceful explosion
- on May 18, 1974 the need to rush production of the Pakistani project became
tantamount.60 Scientists began receiving sensitive nuclear assistance from China in the
form of bomb designs, highly enriched uranium and enrichment facilities. Such cooperation
was spawned by the existence of a shared enemy: India.
Starting in 1987 Pakistan became an exporter of nuclear technology in the form of
the A.Q. Khan network. The Pakistani government still insists that they had no knowledge
of the smuggling ring throughout its 15-year existence, but various documents have proven
this false. High-ranking officials knew of the program within the first couple years of
operation, but chose not to stop it until 2002, when they were able to do so as part of a
strategic political maneuver. 61 The government even provided Khan with assistance in
advertising for nuclear materials, finding shipping facilities, planning logistics and
arranging for security.
From 1987-2002, Pakistan initiated itself securely on the side of the "rogue" nations
by providing sensitive nuclear assistance to Iran, North Korea and Libya, among others. It
established a name for itself as a nuclear nation with enough knowledge and technology
that it could be considered a resource for others. It became a matter of the highest priority
in Pakistan to achieve a full nuclear capability and defend it against those who wanted the
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program to be stopped. "We will protect Pakistan's nuclear program," Bhutto said in 1993,
"and will not allow our national interest to be sacrificed." 62
Nuclear weapons had become a part of the Pakistani national identity and a source
of pride for a country that desperately needed it. At the same time, though, Pakistan was
aware that becoming a nuclear power might make it a target for attack, especially from
India. By the early 1980s Pakistan had all of the materials needed to make a nuclear
weapon on short notice, but it did not rush into production.
Pakistan waited over a decade before performing its first nuclear test, having made
sure that it reached a point where it had multiple technologically sound bombs available
for detonation. Leaders did not want to risk testing the bomb and having it fail, undoing all
of the positivity the nuclear program had brought to the people. When India finally made
its status as a nuclear state known on May 11 and 13, 1998 with five public nuclear tests,
Pakistan responded with six detonations of its own only two weeks later. The press
reported that these blasts had "set off such an explosion of national pride that thousands
danced and sang in the streets across the country."63
Pakistan was the first Muslim country to possess a nuclear weapon and, in it's
opinion, rightfully so. As Bhutto had declared earlier in Pakistan's construction process,
"The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization [had] nuclear capability along with the
communist powers. Only the Islamic civilization was without it."64 What better state was
there to change this fact that the one Islamic state that had been founded in the name of
Islam?
Pakistan had finally proven to the world and it itself that it could, at the very least,
keep on par with India in matters of modernization and technology. It removed some of the
embarrassment of a history peppered with loss after loss in both military and diplomatic
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affairs and proved that it was not afraid to take dramatic steps in the name of defending
Islam. The successful nuclear test was referred to as "an aphrodisiac" that had intoxicated
the Pakistani people with "the sense of national honor that has been restored."65 The
people declared that it was "a moment of pride not only for us but for entire Moslem
world."66
Conclusion: Negativity, but Success
In the past decade, the nuclear program has done little to make the Western world
more amenable to Pakistan. It is still criticized for its support of terrorism and insurgencies
and held up as an example of the world's evils. At the same time, though, it may be one of
the main factors that has kept Pakistan a subject of international attention for so long. It is
impossible to say where Pakistan would be today if it were a non-nuclear state, but it can
be argued that it would have a lot less active and public role in international affairs.
Pakistan's nuclear program is often cited as one of the main reasons for inviting it to
participate in summits, conferences and negotiations today. This may simply be a matter of
keeping your friends close and your enemies closer, but it is attention nonetheless and bad
attention is better than none at all.
Conflict between India and Pakistan has continued steadily with the Kashmir conflicts
of the late 1980s, the 1999 Kargil Crisis and the 2001 terrorist attacks on India that nearly
led to war. The instances of fully armed combat between the states have decreased,
somewhat, though and neither state has yet come close to using their nuclear power for
military purposes. If Pakistani leaders only wanted nuclear weapons so that they could
defeat India in war, they should have used them already. What they have done instead is
use their weapons to further their revisionist intentions.
Nuclear weapons have long been referred to as the "great equalizers" in power
politics. It does not matter which state is more powerful or has a stronger military, in
65 Lev, "Pakistan Welcomes its nuclear testing."
66 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Pakistanis greet nuclear tests with sense of pride."
bilateral relations nuclear states must treat each other as equals. India and Pakistan are no
exception. Pakistan is clearly the weaker of the two powers, yet in a nuclear world it is able
to initiate small, but intense conflicts on a regular basis without truly fearing retaliation.
Nuclear power has been known to make powerful states more cautious in starting wars
and revisionist powers more willing to push their luck and challenge the superiority of the
status quo. Pakistan has done just that.6 7
IV: The Economic Miracle of Japan
World War II was the bloodiest and most widespread war in history. Even those
states that were victorious in battle suffered dramatic military, economic and political
losses. For those that lost, this damage was coupled with the shame of failure and defeat,
especially in Japan.
World War II did not just mark a period of military defeat for Japan. It also led to the
loss of an expanding empire, the devastation of its infrastructure and the loss of the pride
and spirit that had previously defined the Japanese culture. Civilians and soldiers alike
worried about what they would tell fallen soldiers that they had lost during the war and
how they would be able to honor their sacrifices without victory. One famous author wrote
an "apology to departed heroes" and journalists spoke of the "autumn of the hundred
million weeping together" with "silent wailing throughout the land."68
Broken and defeated, the Japanese government struggled to find some way to
restore a sense of pride to its people and regain respect in the international community.
Japan needed to find a way to remove itself from the shadow of occupation and the stigma
of defeat. It did so through a process of complete economic overhaul. The Japanese
economic turnaround is one of the most miraculous examples of growth in history and an
excellent model of successful status readjustment.
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Identity in Japan
Japan has always prided itself on the fact that it is a homogenous nation with one
language and culture shared by the entire population. Unlike many states, religion is not
considered part of such identity. In fact, many Japanese households are actually multi-
religious. Instead, ethnicity is defined by language and tradition.
Prior to World War II immigrants to Japanese territories - the majority of whom
came from Korea - were allowed to become citizens if they took on new names, spoke only
Japanese and assimilated into the culture.69 This allowed Japan's population to expand
while still holding on to its reputation of homogeneity.
The unity of Japan gave rise to its "Yamato Spirit", which was touted throughout the
war. This spirit made the Japanese fearsome fighters, unafraid to lose their lives in battle
and unwilling to give up. Soldiers and civilians alike were told that there was more honor in
dying "like shattered jewels" than living with defeat and most seemed to agree with this
pronouncement.7 0 Being forced to surrender to the allied forces threatened the existence of
the Yamato spirit and caused many Japanese to question the utility of their national pride.
When Japan adopted a new constitution following the war it hardened its stance on
national identity and included a stipulation that "the conditions necessary for being a
Japanese national shall be determined by law."71 The main stipulation - set out in the
Nationality Law of 1950 - was that a person could only be Japanese by birth. All others had
to complete the nationalization process before becoming citizens. Foreigners could no
longer assimilate into the Japanese culture on language alone; they would have to live in
Japan for at least five years and commit to giving up their former nationality before they
could apply to be a member of Japanese society.7 2 This led many former citizens to
emigrate from Japan if favor of their homeland or the United States.
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For the people of Japan, their nationality is not just an indicator of where they live,
but an institutionalized part of life. They pride themselves on being Japanese and how that
makes them different from the rest of the world. Their self-image is tied to the respect and
honor of their state and the two cannot be separated. Major losses or victories by the
Japanese state are felt by the people as well.
Japan's Fall: World War II
The Japanese empire began with the Meji Restoration in 1868 and expanded steadily
until World War II. By 1942 the Empire reached north to the Aleutian Islands, South to the
Dutch East Indies and West to the interior of China and Mongolia. 73 By the time of its
entrance into WWII, Japan controlled almost the entirety of the South Pacific.
At the end of the war, though, Japan was occupied by the allied powers and lost its hold
on the vast majority of its empire. It was forced to adopt a new constitution and changed
so drastically that "after 1945, most Japanese historians saw not only the recent past but
their country's entire modern history as discredited."74 All of the past successes of Japan
were called into question as possible flukes rather than triumphs of the Japanese spirit.
Japan lost over one million civilians and 1.74 million servicemen - with another 4.5
million wounded - over the course of the war.75 Its infrastructure and economy were in
ruins. The government was struggling to deal with the overwhelming cost of rebuilding
entire cities that had been destroyed in allied bombing raids, including history's only two
atomic attacks. The Japanese people viewed their country's loss with "shame and
dishonour" and fell into a state of national depression and disorientation. 76
Estimates of exactly how much Japan lost in the war are varied, but most scholars
agree that it was somewhere around one quarter of the state's total wealth. Some also
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argue that, due to the crumbling infrastructure, Japan also lost half of its potential income
over the next few years. 77 Japan emerged from a three-year war into a six and a half year
occupation where its very sovereignty and stability were put to the test. The Japanese
people could not comprehend the concept of unconditional surrender and the loss of glory
and empire.
The Paths Not Taken
At the end of World War II, Japan had no clear, viable options for status adjustment.
It was looking at years of rebuilding and reorganizing before it could even hope to make
strides on any of the four paths. It was a mixture of luck, good timing and great
management skills that would allow Japan to follow the economic path and achieve such
astounding success. Pursuing any of the other three paths would have been much more
difficult and, most likely, futile.
Winning a War
Fighting and winning a war was probably the last path considered by Japan's
leaders following its defeat in World War II. It had already lost a large portion of its fighting
forces and was still trying to get a handle on how it would afford the costs of World War II.
The prospects for Japan winning a war in the 1950s were slim to none and the
consequences of it starting a war and losing were far too great to risk.
Japan was occupied by American forces immediately following the war, making any
attempt at military movement impossible until the troops were removed. Even then, Japan
would be subject to close scrutiny by the Allied forces who still did not trust that it would
remain peaceful. Any venture toward war would have resulted in immediate retaliation
with possibly even more disastrous results. It is unlikely that Japan would have been
allowed to maintain its sovereignty and regain power if it initiated another major war.
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Domestically, there was virtually no desire to go to war again at any point in the
near future. A peace movement had begun to spread throughout Japan, founded on the
belief that "Japan could partially atone for its past... by drawing on its atomic bomb
experience to become a champion of a nonmilitarized, nonnuclearized world."78 A leader
cannot chose a path of status adjustment that is people are wholeheartedly against
especially the path of war, which requires nationwide sacrifices.
Nuclear Proliferation
The nuclear history of Japan began with the opening of the country's first nuclear
physics lab in 1931.79 At the same time, the Japanese military began researching nuclear
power to see if it could be used in creating a super weapon. Progress was slow on both
fronts, though, because the military distrusted the scientists who had been educated in
Western states. 80
By the beginning of World War II Japan had yet to make any significant steps in its
nuclear research. When the Japanese military was defeated at Midway, though, Admiral
Yamamoto ordered the nations scientists to begin work on "epoch-making weapons" and to
complete them before the war was over.81
A lack of funding slowed the pace of the nuclear program and limited its ability to
achieve any worthwhile results. Japanese scientists were never able to fully understand
how a nuclear bomb worked. They believed that it was essentially an out of control nuclear
reactor. By the time an allied bombing raid destroyed the state's main nuclear lab in 1945,
scientists had come to the conclusion that there was no way to harness the power of a
nuclear bomb and make it practical for use in war.
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Months later Japan was proven disastrously wrong as the American bombs were
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The memory of these attacks left society with a sense
of dread that could not be dissociated from the idea of nuclear weapons. One of the main
tenents of the Japanese peace movement was to pursue the creation of a nonnuclear world.
To the Japanese nuclear weapons were cruel, inhuman, and a representation of all that is
evil about war.
Political Negotiation
The damage done to Japan during World War II preoccupied the government for
years after surrender. Attempts to repair the economy, rebuild cities and assuage the fears
of the domestic population took precedence over nearly all international issues. Japanese
leaders spent their days just trying to keep their country from collapsing. They did not have
the time to dedicate themselves to an international political issue.
Even if Japan had wanted to pursue a political path to prestige, it is unlikely it would
have had much success. An intense hatred of the Japanese state and people had spread
throughout the West during the course of World War II. The Japanese were portrayed as
"terrible people - murderers and rapists." 82 There was widespread fear that they were
going to take over the world and destroy the west. This fear was exemplified in the use of
concentration camps by the United States to round up and keep track of all Japanese-
Americans. Even after they were defeated there was fear that the Japanese could rise up
and lead the world into war once again.
The political path of status adjustment requires states to build relationships of trust
with one another and engage in a long series of negotiations and debates. No state was
willing to engage in such a vulnerable exchange with a state it hated and feared. Japan
would have to prove its trustworthiness in another manner before it could hope to gain
support and backing for any of its political ideas.
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The Chosen Path: Economics
Almost immediately following the end of World War II the Japanese government
began searching for ways to jumpstart its ravaged economy. They tried everything from
printing money to destroying financial records, relaxing bookkeeping standards and
withdrawing money from government investments. This led to massive inflation and sent a
signal that a more comprehensive and well thought-out approach was needed.
The first comprehensive attempt at economic recovery came in the form of "priority
production" where certain industries designated as important to industrial growth - such
as coal and steel - received government loans. 83 This program was not meant as a
permanent solution, but as a stopgap for inflation until more lasting measures could be put
in place.
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Figure 3: Japan's Path of Status Adjustment
Japan's path toward economic recovery took its first major step with the
establishment of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which would
become the driver behind Japan's economic turnaround. MITI provided Japan with a single
organization able to coordinate between industry and trade in order to maximize the utility
83 Uekusa and Ide, Industrial Policy in Japan.
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of Japan's production center. It was given control over both private and government sector
development so that the economy could be streamlined and perfected.
The decade following the war was a period of heavy industrialization throughout
Japan. Having saved itself from economic collapse, the Japanese government was now
attempting to "catch up" to the rest of the world. Economic recovery was no longer simply
an issue of state survival; it was a matter of respect on an international scale. Japan had to
prove that it was a state capable of providing for itself and contributing to the international
community.
Western nations, especially the United States, discouraged and belittled Japan's
attempts at industrialization. They believed that Japan should concentrate on making
"oriental specialties" rather than trying to compete with the more modernized nations. US
envoys encouraged the Japanese government to focus their economic production on
technologically inferior products such as "cocktail napkins."84
This discouragement did not stop the Japanese financial planners. It made them
determined to prove the Western world wrong. Economic development was no longer just
a matter of just recovery; it was a matter of pride. MITI looked at the rapid advancements
in science, technology and managerial skills that Japan had made prior to the war and
determined that they could reignite this growth and find a place among the economic
powers of the world.
The more negativity Japan faced, the more determined it became to grow by leaps
and bounds. The Japanese people needed something to redeem their damaged pride and
the rapid modernization of the economy did just that. It proved that they were a member of
84Supposedly John Foster Dulles told a high ranking official in the Japanese Finance
Ministry that his country should consider exporting things like cocktail napkins. He said
they could never produce the goods that people in the US actually wanted, Dower,
Embracing Defeat, 537.
the first world and one of the leaders of the international community, not simply a quiet,
defeated passenger.
The next step Japan's economic growth took was largely a matter of good luck and
timing. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States found itself in
desperate need of military supplies in East Asia on short notice. Since the occupation in
Japan was still in full swing, the US saw the opportunity to produce these goods close to the
theatre of operation at reduced costs. They set up a policy of "special procurements"
allowing Japan to produce and sell military equipment to US troops - which was technically
illegal under the laws of the occupation.
Over the course of the three-year war, US procurements brought $2.3billion to Japan
- more than Japan was receiving in aid over the same period of time.85 The US involvement
in Japan attracted investment from major European powers as well. Most of the Western
states were operating near their maximum industrial capacity and desperately needed to
develop new means of production. Japan was one of the last industrialized societies left
that still had room to expand.
Japan found itself with an unprecedented opportunity to forge ties with large,
powerful states and make itself a necessary part of their daily operations. It had the chance
to change its reputation from that of a backward, hostile national only capable of producing
"oriental trinkets" to a state capable of the highest level of technological advancement.
When sovereignty was officially restored to Japan on April 28, 1952 the government was
well positioned for making itself an important and respected player on a global scale.
The 1960s were a decade of liberalization and economic expansion in Japan. The
government adopted a Foreign Exchange and International Trade Liberalization Plan in
1960, which relaxed government trading regulations and helped encourage new
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international economic partnerships. By 1964 93% of Japan's trade had been liberalized. 86
This new openness allowed Japan to enter major international economic organizations
such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and made
Japan into an Article VIII member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 87
By the mid-1960s the government was able to shift its focus from international
growth to social development. The rapid economic growth in Japan had dramatically
improved its international standing and involvement, but it had left much of the domestic
population behind. The brisk pace of industrialization had led to extreme urbanization
without the infrastructure in place to maintain it. Japan was experiencing widespread
problems with pollution, poverty and energy consumption.
MITI began shifting its focus from continuing expansion to promoting socially
motivated policies such as creating a pollution free society, stabilizing prices, increasing
consumption and improving consumer life.88 By 1975, they had enough extra capital to
invest in the creation of a welfare state as well. 89
The growth of the Japanese economy did not produce only positive results, though.
Its rapid expansion spread fears of a revived militarism in Japan, especially in China.
Chinese leaders accused Japan of being the main obstacle standing between them and
reunification with Taiwan.90 The United States, which had been the biggest supporter of
Japan's economic growth, even became disillusioned with its pace and began issuing
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sanctions and defensive tariffs against Japan for restricting foreign involvement in its
domestic economy.91
Conclusion: The Bubble Burst and Growth Stabilization
The pace of growth experienced by Japan after World War II was unprecedented. It
resulted from a mixture of luck, good timing, modernization and policy planning, but it
could not continue indefinitely.
The increase in personal capital experienced by many Japanese citizens led to a
major swell in both the stock and real estate industries, but both were finite sources. By
1989, both industries were suffering from severe overinvestment and were pushed to the
point of collapse. Japan's constantly rising "economic bubble" had reached its breaking
point.92
The result was the "Lost Decade" of the 1990s during which Japan faced financial
failures, severe drops in outward foreign direct investment and the end of its capital
growth. In the arena of international relations, though, this crash proved to be a blessing. It
actually helped increase Japan's reputation in the international community and improved
its relations with other states.
Japan had grown so rapidly after World War II that by the end of the Cold War other
states had begun to fear that it would grow into a new enemy. It was taking over the
economic world and pushing other states out of important markets. When Japan's
economic bubble burst it removed the fear that Japan would become the new world
superpower, taking the place of the Soviet Union.
The last few decades were not easy for Japan, but they were not unbearable either.
The pace of economic recovery slowed drastically, but it never fell back toward its
immediate postwar levels. Today Japan has the third largest economy in the world with a
91 Dart, "Reagan, Japanese envoy discuss imports, sanctions."
92 Packard, "The United States-Japan Security Treaty," 95.
near-monopoly on both the automotive and electronics industries.93 It has become an
important trading ally of all the world's major powers and secured itself a permanent invite
to nearly every major international political negotiation.
Japanese automobiles and high-quality goods have been flooding Western markets
since the 1960s, shocking and impressing the world. Over the course of two decades Japan
went from being a demonized enemy of war to being a model for other states to follow.
Books were written throughout the world touting the successes of Japan. One Harvard
professor even wrote a book entitled "Japan as Number One: Lessons for America."94
The world became fascinated with studying "what it means to be Japanese" and
determining how the character and culture of the Japanese people had allowed them to
perform this economic miracle. Japanese academics and culturalists found a new discourse
studying and explaining what made their state different from and superior to all others.
They emphasized the legacy of Emperor Hirohito as an example of the longevity, survival
and preeminence of Japanese culture.
Japan's embarrassment and defeat had been erased in the minds of its people and the
international community. It was now a state to be respected and revered, not one to be
hated and fought. It found its place in the economic fabric of the international community
and gained the respect and legitimacy needed to revive Japanese nationalism and keep the
state functioning on the level of a major power.
V: France's Reliance on a Nuclear Legacy
"Next time there's a war in Europe," begins a famous one-liner, "the loser has to
keep France." World War II marked the final step in France's gradual decline from
superpower status. Following its defeat at the hands of the German army France was no
longer the pinnacle of class and culture that other states aspired to be. It was now a joke
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shared by the majority of the civilized world. As General George S. Patton declared, "I
would rather have a German division in front of me than a French one behind me." And he
was not the only one.
Even today, over sixty years after World War II, jokes about the inability of France to
defend itself and its historically poor performance in modern warfare are still popular
throughout the United States. One episode of the TV show The Simpsons has Marge Simpson
saying, "We can stand here like the French, or we can do something about it." Standup
comedians and late night talk show hosts came up with weeks' worth of jokes over French
reluctance to fight in Iraq. "The only way the French are going in is if we tell them we found
truffles in Iraq," said comedian Dennis Miller while Jay Leno declared that he was not
"surprised that France won't help us get Saddam out of Iraq. After all, France wouldn't help
us get the Germans out of France!" This ridicule and embarrassment is one of the reasons
France pursued nuclear weapons in the first place and the reason that it still holds on to
them today.
France has the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, yet it has no major
enemies and faces no critical security threats today. What is does have, though, is a
reputation for being unsuccessful and easy to conquer. The recent history of France has
been a continuous struggle to shed this reputation and prove to the world that it can fend
for itself on an international scale, independent of US or European support.
Identity in France
The French have always felt a very strong connection to the past. They remember an
age of kings and riches where France was a superpower in control of a large portion of the
known world. They tout their implicit nationalism as a motivation for nearly every major
political decision. Other states recognize that "French pride is probably the most concrete
substance in all of Europe" and that, above all else, "The French cannot bear to be made to
look foolish."95 Yet when asked to define what exactly it means to be French, the people
draw a blank.
Since the French Revolution of 1789 - the first French movement founded on truly
nationalist sentiments - France has played host to five different republics, three
monarchies, two empires and the Vichy puppet government of World War II. In each of
these states nationalism found the most support in those groups opposing the current
government. Leaders of popular movements would claim that the current structure was
leading the country away from its true self and that the people needed to return France to
her glory. The number of different governments that have been replaced over the years,
though, has sent a mixed message about what "France" really is.
Even today, over two hundred years after the Revolution, the government is still
debating what exactly it means to be French. President Sarkozy recently set up a series of
town-hall-style meetings across France to discuss what defines a person as French in the
21st century. The meetings were criticized as being anti-immigrant, though, and failed to
solve the age-old question.96
France's identity has taken many shapes over the years, especially in the past
century. Twentieth century France is marred by military defeats and political insults, which
have been used to fuel the fires of nationalism, but to what ends? The leaders and people
are vocal and passionate about their love for France and what it means to be French, yet
they do not know what that entails. This has left France lost and confused and has forced
leaders to take drastic steps over the years in an attempt to consolidate their people.
France's Fall: World War II
On June 25, 1940 France formally surrendered to German forces, years before
World War II ended and far before any of the other allied major powers. After a four-year
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struggle at resistance and the establishment of a puppet government sympathetic to Axis
demands, France had to be bailed out by its allies in order to survive.
Nearly 1.5million Frenchmen were killed during the course of the war, a relatively
small number compared to many other participating nations, but France's losses extended
far beyond just population.97 Its infrastructure and economy were in ruins. It had
temporarily lost its sovereignty and it had lost its legitimacy in international affairs. France
had been one of the first nations to join the fight in World War II and it had led the charge
against Germany. At the end, though, it was not even given a seat at the table to negotiate
peace.
When the conferences were held at Yalta and Potsdam to discuss European
reorganization the heads of state from the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union
were invited, but France was left at home. The world's major powers sent a message to
France - it was no longer a superpower and would not be treated as such.
France needed to find a way to stop its backward slide and save itself from being
nothing more than the memory of a once great nation. The path it would choose - and still
stick to today - is that of nuclear proliferation. Its road to prestige has not been smooth,
though. From its attempts at political maneuvering to its continuing failure in war France
has had to overcome many obstacles in its pursuit of status adjustment.
The Paths Not Taken
Before beginning its nuclear career, France attempted to join the political
negotiations regarding disarmament and lead the European delegation against Germany.
This quest was unsuccessful and short-lived, though. France met with political defeat on
more than one occasion and was forced to shift its focus to nuclear power. French leaders
passed on the other two paths - war and economics - and did so with good reason.
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Winning a War
France's recent history with war had been nothing short of an embarrassing failure.
Its military losses were not just criticized by the world, but turned into popular jokes. And
World War II was only one in a long series of losses. Within the next two decades France
would be forced into - and out of - two colonial wars, first in Indochina and then in Algeria
and be driven militarily out of its investments in the Suez Canal.
The French military was not able to regain its footing until late in the twentieth
century and was never able to fully rid itself of the stigma of being a "loser". It spent
decades rebuilding and restructuring its forces as it faced loss after loss. By the time the
French military was strong enough to win a war again, France's nuclear program was
already in full swing.
Economic Adjustment
France has always maintained a relatively high position in the international
economy, even following its various military defeats. At the end of World War 11, though,
this position was in serious jeopardy. The indemnities France was forced to pay to
Germany and the seizure of its industrial plants had forced shutdowns in many of France's
major production lines.98
When France was finally able to begin the process of reconstruction following the
war, all of the government's resources had to be used just to return France to its previous
economic position. In order to follow an economic path to status adjustment a state needs
to significantly increase its level of economic involvement. Simply returning itself to its
former position would not have removed the stigma of France's military loss and there was
very little room for France to grow beyond where it had been before.
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Without the discovery of a new industry or the chance to gain a monopoly on a
particular high-value trade France would never have been able to repair its damaged
reputation through economic means alone.
The First Chosen Path: Politics
When it first began its nuclear program, France attempted to use the possibility of it
developing a nuclear weapon as a bargaining chip in international negotiations. It offered
to give up its nuclear ambitions on more than one occasion in order to take the lead on the
international disarmament process, the reunification of Germany or the creation of a
collective European defense.
The French nuclear program first began with the creation of the Commissariat d
I'energie atomique (CEA) on October 18, 1945. CEA was tasked with finding practical
peaceful applications for nuclear technology. It promoted the image of a nuclear bomb as
"nonsensical", useful only to superpowers engaged in a cold war and not at all useful in a
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military conflict.99 This did not stop their research into nuclear power, though, and France
was able to complete its first nuclear chain reaction in 1948
99 Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 88-89.
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The announcement that France's nuclear reactor was now operational was praised
in the press as an example of the "radiance of France." It proved that France was not as far
behind the other great powers as they may think.100 The CEA continued to expand its
nuclear research and was soon able to harness the power of nuclear reactors to begin
powering cities. It produced one of the fastest growing and most technologically advanced
nuclear research programs in history in just a handful of years. It had also provided itself
with a significant bargaining chip for future European negotiations.
The biggest security threat to the French state and people in 1950 was that of a
rearmed Germany. When the United States began proposing such rearmament, France
responded immediately with a counterproposal. The French government suggested the
creation of a European Defense Council (EDC), which would include France, the United
States, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries. Part of the EDC treaty stipulated
that no member of the Council could build or use atomic weapons and all nuclear material
must be used for peaceful purposes.101
France offered to give up its ever-expanding nuclear program for the opportunity to
be part of a small number of important European leaders and almost succeeded in doing so.
It was the French parliament which ultimately brought a stop to the EDC because it did not
expressly eliminate the possibility of German rearmament. The French leaders were forced
to return to the drawing board.
By 1953, France was once again facing military defeat, this time in the Indochina
war. French forces were unable to defend Dien Bien Phu against the invading communist
troops and had to pull out of the region. At the same time, NATO began shifting its defense
policies under American guidance. The United States proposed the creation of a
Multilateral Nuclear Defense Force (MLF) under NATO control that could be used to
threaten atomic retaliation against the Soviet Union for any excursion into Western
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territory. 102 Under this new policy, France would have been a second rate member of a US
coalition and ran the risk of becoming irrelevant in European and world affairs.
France once again tried to lead the world toward nuclear disarmament during the
nine-power conference on Germany held in September 1954. The French delegates agreed
to drop their demands for discriminatory policies against Germany if all the European
powers would commit to giving up their rights to nuclear weapons. 103 Since France could
not yet contribute to NATO's new nuclear policies, it tried to lead the shift to a world where
no one had nuclear capabilities.
This path was unable to gain traction, though, as Mendes France refused to commit
France to giving up its nuclear ambitions without assurances from all other European
states that they would follow suit. With the Cold War heating up and the USSR expanding
its sphere of influence, this proved to be an impossible task.
On December 26, 1954 Mendes France finally abandoned his calls for
nonproliferation and announced to his private advisors that he would authorize the
creation of a nuclear weapons program "because it was capital for France's international
influence" and would allow them to "have more of a say" in disarmament discussions and
the future of European society.104
As a conventionally armed power, France was becoming increasingly marginalized
in the great power world of NATO. It received protection guarantees and a supposed
"nuclear umbrella" from the United States and the United Kingdom, yet it received no glory
or recognition. As a nuclear power, France may become a target for the Soviet Union - it
would be the only mainland European nuclear power and a much easier target than the
closely intertwined US or UK - but it would be independent. For the French, the possibility
of glory was more important than a vague, unspoken threat of Soviet retaliation.
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The Mendes France government fell a month after the private meeting, not having
made an official declaration of its bomb program. It had succeeded in planting the idea of
proliferation in the minds of high-ranking officials, though, and subsequent leaders would
be unable to renege on the promise of a nuclear-armed France.
The Second Chosen Path: Proliferation
Since Mendes France had been driven out of office before signing the nuclear
program into law, it was left to the succeeding Prime Ministers to decide whether they
would follow through with proliferation or not. When Guy Mollet came to power in 1956,
he intended to rescind the verbal decree and dedicate all nuclear research solely to
peaceful purposes. France was in a precarious international position, though, as it
struggled to hold on to the colony of Algeria and its influence in the Suez.
Mollet did not take into account the strong nationalist coalition that had begun
developing in the face of the continuing military deteats. Led by political juggernauts like de
Gaulle and Mendes France the coalitions avidly supported nuclear power and threatened to
tear the country apart politically if Mollet stopped the nuclear program. This was not an
empty threat. The nationalists controlled a large portion of the French Parliament and had
the support of the military, which saw "nuclear weapons as the key to restoring France's
prestige and international political respect."105
Fearing revolution, Mollet was forced to concede and announced in July 1956 that
France would become a full member of EURATOM and begin working on achieving a
domestic nuclear capability. 106 His chance at redemption was short-lived, though, as France
was defeated in the Suez crisis of October 1956 and the Algerian conflict continued to rage
on.
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At the 1956 V-E Day ceremony, held every year to commemorate the end of World
War II, ten thousand students and veterans threw rocks and tomatoes at French officials in
protest of their failure to put down the Algerian rebellion.107 With superior military
capabilities and a strong presence in the African state, France should have been able to
squelch the rebellion quickly and with limited effort. Yet it would take nearly six years
before a resolution could be reached - a resolution that was decided almost entirely in
favor of Algeria.
The French military lost a war to an African rebel group that the government
referred to as an "artificial organization." French leaders refused to even call the fighting in
Algeria a war and instead referred to it as "pacification."108 A pacification that required half
a million troops and was bleeding the French military resources.109 In short, "the recent
history of France [was] an embarrassment to the French."110 A transition of power was
needed or else France risked losing any credibility it still retained.
Charles de Gaulle, a military man and the champion of a radiant and glorious France
was selected as the new French Premiere. Still fighting a losing battle in Algeria and
suffering from the memory of the failed Fourth Republic, de Gaulle initiated a new
statewide strategy he referred to as grandeur. He aimed to restore the greatness of the
French name by proving that France was its own independently powerful state that did not
need alliances or international assistance. De Gaulle purposely distanced the French state
from NATO and the European Economic Community, which he believed called for France to
be subservient to other powers.
Grandeur, to de Gaulle, could be achieved by showcasing France's role as the
preeminent power on the European colony. This required France to secure independence
from the other great powers of the world and prove that it was second to no one in its
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leadership of Europe. 111 It would no longer be a second rate member of a US coalition, but
its own leader and protector. Building of a French nuclear weapon, according to de Gaulle,
was the perfect way to do this.
De Gaulle proposed the creation of an Anglo-French-American triumvirate that
would combine resources, operational commands and atomic secrets in defense of Europe.
The Americans brushed off the suggestion, though, citing France's recent military defeats
and the fact that it had not yet proven its nuclear capabilities to the world.112
This rejection pushed de Gaulle to publicly campaign against NATO and its
willingness to bow to American hegemony. Insulted by the suggestion that it was not
important enough to be a partner to the United States, France shifted more resources
toward the nuclear program and drastically increased the pace of its production. It was
determined to prove that it was not "merely a lieutenant to Uncle Sam," but a proud and
successful state in its own right.113
On February 13, 1960, France demonstrated its first successful nuclear explosion,
showing the world that it could achieve victory in at least one area of military affairs. It had
proven that it was one of the world's most modern and advanced states, possessing a
weapon held by only three other nations in the world - the United States, the Soviet Union
and Great Britain.
Upon receiving confirmation of the test's success, de Gaulle immediately wrote to
the leaders at CEA thanking them for their contribution to saving France's reputation.
"Hurrah for France, " he wrote, "Since this morning she is stronger and prouder."114
Newspaper headlines throughout the country read "Vive La France" and a resurgence of
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French nationalism began. 115 France now possessed its own nuclear deterrent. It did not
have to play by the rules of NATO or the US if it did not want to and it flaunted that power.
From 1966-1974, France detonated 41 bombs in atmospheric tests in the South
Pacific, including its first thermonuclear bomb in 1968.116 France was the last major power
to continue testing nuclear weapons - it continued testing into the late 90s, when the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was being negotiated117 - unwilling to give in to
international pressures to ban testing without a formal and legally-binding agreement.
Conclusion: Maintaining the Nuclear Legacy
By the end of the twentieth century France had developed the third largest nuclear
arsenal and the largest nuclear energy industry in the world. 118 Anti-nuclear sentiment
began to spread throughout Europe following the end of the Cold War, but never really
caught on in France.119 The government continued to emphasize France's "special position"
on the European continent and the ways in which its weapons benefit all of Europe.
The state that once led the push for the prohibition of atomic weapons was now an
active and vocal member of the nuclear club. All of its proposals for disarmament had been
rejected or ignored, leaving France with no choice but to change paths and draw
international attention to itself in an entirely different manner. De Gaulle had chosen "to
enhance the 'glory' of France by proving that she, too, is capable of massive destruction."120
Only then could France guarantee that it would retain a voice on an international scale.
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By the time it completed its nuclear arsenal, France's reputation and glory had
become synonymous with its nuclear capability. Citizens, soldiers and leaders alike praise
the greatness of France as a modern, advanced state. Long after the threat of a hostile
Germany or a resurgent Soviet Union have come and gone France clings to these weapons
as evidence that it is still a great and glorious state.
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CHAPTER 5: IRAN AND THE PATH OF NUCLEAR PRESTIGE
I. Introduction
Iran has a long and colorful history beginning as one of the greatest empires of the
Ancient world and ending up today as an isolated "pariah" in the international community.
As one scholar put it, the "Iranian self-image is a contradictory combination of the legacy of
great empires and regional dominance on the one hand and the history of humiliation and
abuse by foreign powers on the other."121
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Iran landed somewhere in between
these two extremes. It was not a superpower, but it enjoyed normal diplomatic and
economic relations with the rest of the world and lived in relative prosperity. During the
Cold War it served as an important base for Western allies in the fight against the Soviet
Union. Ever since the Revolution in 1979, though, Iran's reputation has been in steep
decline. Today it is publicly characterized as "evil" by other states, media outlets and
international organizations.
Both United States and United Nations policies toward Iran are driven by the belief
that Iran is pursuing weapons of mass destruction technology against international norms
and needs to be punished. For this reason, Iran is often excluded from international affairs
and treated as a third world country incapable of deciding its own fate.
Diplomats, scholars and other leaders have promoted the view that an Iranian
nuclear weapon is detrimental to regional stability and global security and needs to be
stopped. The United States has led the charge to discredit Iran, pronouncing it a member of
the "axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world".122 In the views of the West, Iran
is a hostile "rogue" that needs to be dealt with.
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This inflamed rhetoric and the reliance on sanctions has only fueled the Iranian
desire for nuclear weapons, though, and has reinforced the power of its nationalism.
Leaders and citizens alike have declared that "we will never bow to oppression and
hegemonic policies" attempting to regulate the nuclear program in Iran.123 Such statements
make it seem as though Iran's nuclear weapons program is not a matter of security, but an
issue of nationalism and pride.
II: Identity in Iran
As the only majority Persian and Shiite country in the world, Iran has always shown
a strong national identity defined by the differences between it and the nations around it.
This identity is ingrained in children from a young age and reinforced through lifetime
involvement in politics and society. Iran has had an institutionalized public education
system since 1855, which teaches the ideals of Shia Islam, the grand history of the Persian
Empire and the role of Iran at the head of the Islamic World.124 It was reorganized after the
Revolution as a way to introduce the "ideals of the revolution" to future generations of
Iranian children as well.i25
Mass education is the breeding ground for strong nationalist ideals. It helps form a
national identity by teaching children a single shared history and defining their culture
from an early age. It provides mass literacy so that this education can be continued
throughout life and it introduces the concept of nationalism and national identity to the
people.126 The long history of Iran's education system has allowed for generations of
nationalist sentiment to permeate the culture.
The foundation of Iranian nationalism lies in the memory of the once great Persian
Empire, the largest empire of the Ancient World. The ancient Persians conquered the
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kingdoms of Egypt and Babylon and ruled over the entire Middle East. This legacy has led
Iranian leaders to declare themselves the rightful rulers of the Islamic world, a role that
would entitle them to display all the glory and technological advancements any rival may
pursue.
The international community does not view Iran with this same level of reverence
and respect, though. Iran's ascribed status is far below what the people and leaders believe
it should be. Discussions on the future of Iran and how to deal with its rising nuclear
program or violations of international law are held regularly, often without even inviting
the Iranians to the table. Many of the world's great powers believe that they know how
Iran should function better than the state's leaders themselves. Iran is not seen as being a
legitimate and important state among the major powers of the world.
This lack of prestige first became clear following the Revolution in 1979 and the
breaking of diplomatic ties with much of the Western World. The Revolution was meant to
be a triumph of modernity in Iran, a move toward an improved life for all and a message to
the world that Iran was a powerful state that needed to be recognized. Instead, Iran was
met with derision by much of the world and left open to a bloody and expensive war which
it lost to an opponent with inferior military capabilities.
The Revolution was a manifestation of the Iranian belief that it was a state endowed
with the responsibility of defending Islam and leading the Islamic world. This sense of duty
has been reiterated by many of its leaders and politicians in recent decades. In 1995
Ambassador Hoseyn Musavian told the world that Iran "has the final say in the world of
Islam at present and is a cultural and political superpower ... such a country cannot be
ostracized."127
Opposition to Iran's role in the Middle East has not diminished this feeling of
entitlement; in fact, it has served to increase the Iranian resolve. Iran is a Shiite state, rather
127 Quoted in: Strain, Discering Iran's Nuclear Strategy, 22.
than a Sunni state like many of its neighbors, which is an important distinction on many
levels, especially when discussing how it reacts to opposition and insults.
Shia Islam is based on the "tradition of martyrdom and sacrifice in the face of
opposition and attack."128 This tradition is based off the belief that the true heir of
Mohammed was Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was martyred in 680 and whose death is celebrated
each year, in some cases with rituals of self-flagellation.129 The idea of sacrificing personal
well being for the glory of Islam is ingrained in the teachings of Shiism and shows itself in
Iran's reactions to the Western world.
Antagonism to the Iranian nuclear program fuels its religious roots and makes the
people and clerics of Iran more determined to stand up for what they believe in. They are
willing to sacrifice some of their economic prosperity in order to serve as a model for other
nations wishing to pursue nuclear power and struggle against outside oppression.
Iran has become increasingly isolated from the rest of the world ever since the
Revolution. It has no true allies and is in a state of "strategic loneliness."130 This has allowed
a divisive image of an Iranian identity to form among the people. The idea of being an
Iranian has transcended internal divisions largely due to the presence of an outsider group.
The outsiders in this case being the Western world.
Referred to as the "Great Satan" by Ayatollah Khomeini and nearly every leader
since, the Western world has fallen neatly into the role of the evil and dominant aggressor
the Iranian portray it to be. When the United States declared Iran as a member of the "Axis
of Evil" - a change from its previous description of the Persian state as a "rogue" - Iran
viewed this as an insult to their dignity. Government leaders referred to the label as
"another brutish manifestation of the United States''global arrogance'."131 This label helped
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to further incite the Iranian people against outside influence and solidify their sense of
nationalism and solidarity.
Iranian leaders have capitalized on this sense of isolation "by underscoring
Washington's double standards, hypocrisy and heavy-handed tactics." 132 The further
isolated Iran becomes and the more the people are forced to sacrifice and suffer for what
they believe is a national right, the stronger domestic support for nuclear weapons and
other controversial policies grows.
III. Iran's Fall: The Revolution and Iran-Iraq War
From its history as one of the greatest empires in the ancient world to one of the
most hated countries in the modern world, Iran has experienced both extreme highs and
lows in its state prestige. Throughout most of the twentieth century, though, it fell
somewhere in between.
Beginning in World War II and continuing throughout much of the Cold War, Iran
occupied a position of strategic importance for many of the world's great powers. This is
not to say that it was treated as an equal, but it was given a degree of respect and prestige
that it no longer has today. President Roosevelt signed a public declaration in 1943
thanking Iran for its support in World War II and the State Department considered the
shipment of arms and materials to the Iranian army as a matter of "high priority"
throughout the 1940s.133
The relationship between Iran and the West continued to grow over the next few
decades due to its strategic positioning in the Middle East. The preoccupation with the Cold
War coupled with the West's faith in the Shah raised Iran to a level of global prominence
that is far above where it exists today. "U.S. policy after August 19, 1953, was effectively to
132 Ibid., 104.
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give the new regime total and unquestioning support. Fear of a Soviet takeover was
uppermost in policymakers' minds."134
The United States, Britain and their allies used Iran as a base for many intelligence
operations in the early days of the Cold War. Iranian citizens were recruited as spies and
bases were set up to collect both signals intelligence and human intelligence. 135
During this time Iran attained a level of prestige by its inclusion in international
affairs and top-secret operations. It was praised for its support, received political and
economic benefits and was never subjected to sanctions or attempts at coercion. Its hold on
this position was tenuous, though, and it lost of all its previously gained prestige
immediately following the Revolution.
The Revolution
The Persian Revolution was a surprisingly peaceful revolt as far as government
turnovers go. Eight months of anti-government riots and protests led the Shah to flee the
country, leaving space for Ayatollah Khomeini to return from exile and establish the Islamic
Republic.
At first, the international community met the new government with caution and
moderation. There were important people within many Western states who encouraged
dealings with Iran and who reached out to Khomeini initially. It quickly became obvious,
though, that Khomeini's words and actions did not meet up. Secret courts were established
to try and execute people suspected of anti-revolutionary activity, attacks were carried out
on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and multiple human rights violations occurred.
Years after the Revolution Khomeini would admit that he had been employing the
Shiite technique khod'eh or "tricking one's enemy into a misjudgement of one's true
position" when he first came to power.136
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As the realities of the Revolution set in, the Western world began cutting its ties
with Iran and excluding it from normal participation in international affairs. Former allies
would no longer negotiate, trade or otherwise communicate with Iran. Almost overnight it
had gone from a position as a normal, functioning member of society to one as a pariah that
could be ignored and, possibly, forgotten.
Iran's ties with the United States were severed by early 1980 following the seizure
of the U.S. Embassy and the subsequent hostage crisis. In the fall of 1980 the United
Kingdom ended its diplomatic relations with Iran and removed its ambassador as well. 137
Many other states followed suit by cutting back or eliminating their relations with the
Iranian Republic. By 1981, Iran had lost over $15billion in exports and $5billion in imports
annually from its pre-Revolutionary levels, extremely steep drops for a country whose
export levels had been steadily increasing throughout the 1970s and had topped out at
$24billion in 1977.138
Before the Ayatollah could take any action to improve Iran's damaged reputation,
the state found itself embroiled in a disastrous, bloody war. Abandoned by its former allies,
and suffering greatly in the economic realm, Iran had become easy prey for long time rival,
Iraq. Prior to the Revolution, relations between Iran and Iraq had been poor, but largely
managed by bilateral agreements - often with concessions on the Iraqi side. Materially, Iran
was more powerful than Iran and it did not lose any of those capabilities following the
Revolution.139 What it did lose was the respect of its former allies and the reverence given
to those countries viewed as important players in the international world.
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The Iran-Iraq War
On September 22, 1980 Iraqi troops crossed the border into Iran by both land and
air, escalating a series of border skirmishes into an all-out war. Iran's actions should have
been condemned by the international community as a threat to regional stability and peace,
but they were met with little more than expressions of disapproval. Iran saw no swell of
support or offers of aid and no one threatened Iraq with sanctions or military action.
Iraq took the lead in the war from the first day and it was almost two years before
Iran was able to fight back. Iranian troops were able to push the Iraqis back across the
border in 1982, but that is where their success stopped. The fighting continued for six
years without reprieve, ending only when the United Nations stepped in to negotiate. Both
sides suffered serious losses and tactical failures.
One of Iraq's most powerful assets throughout the war was its chemical weapons
arsenal. Iran suffered over 34,000 casualties in the chemical attacks and thousands more
from the long-term effects.140 The use of chemical weapons in war was illegal at this point
in time and had been publicly condemned by many of the world's major powers, yet none
of Iran's neighbors or former allies came to its aid when it was the victim of such assaults.
The Iran-Iraq war proved that Iran no longer had any degree of respect or prestige
in the international community was largely a nonentity in global affairs. A war resulting in
hundreds of thousands of casualties for one of the twenty most powerful states in the
world should have been a major event. It should have led to a swell in support and isolation
of the aggressor state for breaking international law, but Iraq suffered virtually no
consequences.
The war ended in 1989 with the signing of a UN-negotiated ceasefire agreement.
Neither side was considered victorious in the war, but it still dealt a major blow to Iranian
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prestige. As the more materially powerful nation prior to the war, Iran should have won,
but instead it struggled just to maintain a stalemate. At the end of the war Iran was left with
military, economic and infrastructural destruction and no allies willing to help in its
recovery.
If there had been any doubt that Iran was suddenly sliding down a path toward
global insignificance following the Revolution, it was erased by the international
community's nearly total lack of reaction to the Iran-Iraq War. Iran was disgraced and
alone, forced to find a way to reintegrate itself into society and prove to its potential
opponents and allies that it was not insignificant. The path Iran chose for such an
announcement was one that garnered almost exclusively negative attention: the pursuit of
nuclear weapons.
IV. The Paths Not Taken
When faced with a drop in status like that suffered by Iran during the 1980s,
pursuing nuclear weapons may not seem like the natural first choice for readjustment.
After looking at Iran's domestic and international situation in 1988, though, it is easier to
see why it was the best choice for Iran at the time.
The Path of War
Fighting a retaliatory war for status adjustment was never really an option for Iran.
The Iran-Iraq war had decimated Iran both economically and politically. The Iranian
government claims that 300,000 were killed in the war and another 500,000 wounded, but
there is some speculation that these numbers may be even higher in reality.' 4 ' The
economic costs of the war still have not been clearly determined, but are estimated to be
over $600billion142 - not including the resulting inflation, new welfare payments resulting
from economic losses, future losses due to decreased productivity, or other unanticipated
future costs.
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By 1988 Iran no longer had the capability or the drive to fight another protracted
war. Iran could no longer be confident in its ability to be victorious in conflicts, even those
where it had a military advantage. In 1980, Iran was the 24th most powerful state in the
world, while Iraq was 34th.143 Even with this supposed statistical advantage, though, Iran
lost the conflict and suffered greatly in the process.
Waging a secondary war to increase prestige would have been nearly impossible for
Iran logistically. It would also have led to a backlash in the domestic political realm from
citizens who had already suffered through one war on their land and would not support
another. It would have been difficult to identify a new enemy and another war with Iraq
was clearly not a possibility. Even if it had been able to choose an opponent and gain
domestic support, though, Iran's prospects for victory were slim to none.
The Economic Path
Iran could not pursue economic status adjustment for largely the same reasons it
could not fight another war - it had suffered severe economic losses both in the war and as
a result of the Revolution. The government had its hands full just trying to recoup the costs
of the war and was not having success at forging new economic ties with the international
community.
Prior to the war, Iran had seen a significant increase in its ability to refine oil
domestically, allowing it to become an exporter of oil, a commodity that could have served
as a strong base for economic advancement. During the war, however, the Iraqi army
developed a pattern of attacking Iranian refineries and production facilities, resulting in
stagnation of Iran's production capabilities. Domestic consumption of oil continued to rise,
though. By the end of the war Iran had become a net oil importer.144
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Outside of the fuel industry, Iran had no viable options for high-value commodity
production of the type needed for increased prestige. It also did not have the trading base
necessary to sustain such extensive trade relationships. Its economic ties to nearly all of the
world's wealthiest states had been cut dramatically ever since the Revolution. 145
Becoming an economic power would have required Iran to develop new, dependent
relationships with those states that had abandoned it in war and which the Iranian people
considered hypocritical and evil. Leaders would have had to make serious concessions on a
political scale to gain favor and run the risk of angering or alienating the very people that
had put them in power in the first place.
The Political Path
For a short time following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1989, it seemed as though Iran might pursue political negotiation as a way to
reinstitute itself into international affairs.
President Bush asked for President Rafsanjani's help in finding and rescuing
American prisoners held in other Middle Eastern countries. Rafsanjani paid a visit to
Moscow, attempting to restart Soviet-Iranian relations and, in 1988, the British reopened
their embassy in Tehran for the first time in nearly a decade.146 As a show of good will
Rafsanjani helped negotiate the release of three Americans taken hostage by Hizbullah in
1990, but he was not rewarded in a way he considered adequate.147
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Relations with the British quickly broke down again after the issuing of afatwa
condemning British author Salman Rushdie to death.148 The United States publicly
condemned Iran for its connections to terrorist organizations and refused to unfreeze the
assets it had blocked following the Revolution. Iran was still not invited to the conferences
on the Middle East Peace Process and was publicly shunned by its neighbors. By 1993 the
United States had announced a policy of "dual containment" against Iran and Iraq, which
ruined any chance of further political involvement with Iran.149
While Iran made some progress in the political realm, it was nowhere near the
levels needed to maintain a political path to prestige. Without giving in to Western
demands and acting as a conciliatory state - something the Iranian people were adamantly
against - Iran have very little hope of playing an sort of role at the forefront of an
international political negotiation. The entire purpose of the Revolution had been to return
Iran to the people and the glory of Islam. Making concessions in order to forge political
connections would have been completely contrary to this idea and risked inciting the
people against the government leaders.
V. The Chosen Path: Proliferation
Unlike the other three paths for status adjustment, Iran was well positioned to use
the pursuit of nuclear weapons as a means of status increase. It had a well established, but
temporarily stalled, nuclear program and had historically used that program as a way to
establish closer connections with the other major powers. A 1988 CIA report concluded
that the proliferation work done in Iran prior to the Revolution "could provide a foundation
for future weapons development." 50
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The decision to go nuclear actually occurred midway through the Iran-Iraq war with
the authorization of a gas centrifuge research program in 1985. Research and development
did not begin until 1988, though.
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Pigure 5: Iran's Path of Status Adjustment
Oriains of the Nuclear Proaram
The nuclear program of Iran originated in the 1950s partly in response to President
Eisenhower's famous "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations. In the speech, the
President called on the advanced nations of the world to research nuclear power and share
their efforts with the international community. In doing so, he stated, "the contributing
Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears
of mankind."11
Around the same time as this speech, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi had a vision of
modernizing Iran and helping it catch up with the major powers of the world. The call for
technological advancement issued by Eisenhower prese'nted Iran with the perfect
opportunity to be recognized and join the communities of the first world. The Shah signed
an educational exchange agreement with the Eisenhower administration and received an
American research reactor for use in the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.15 2
151 Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace."
152 Amuzegar, "Iran's Crumbling Revolution," 91.
99
Iran signed the NPT on July 1, 1968 and ratified it on February 2, 1970, but
continued to expand its nuclear research in conjunction with the West.153 It followed NPT
guidelines for the peaceful use of nuclear technology and was an unremarkable, yet model
member of the nonproliferation regime. Throughout the Cold War, Iranian nuclear
scientists were trained in US and European Universities. This nuclear exchange was
promoted by the West to combat Soviet influence in the Middle East. In the 1970s Iran
expanded its connections by signing nuclear deals with Germany and France. The Shah
invested over $1billion in the construction of the European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium
Enrichment Consortium (Eurodif).15 4
The Revolution temporarily halted the progress of the nuclear program in 1979. The
newly formed Islamic Council declared the building and use of atomic weapons anti-Islamic
and forbid their use. The new government focused its post-Revolution policies on
establishing the dominance of Shari'ah law, which left no real place for a nuclear arsenal.
When the Soviets began building up troops on the Iranian border in 1980, the US
considered many options for response, including a nuclear threat. Iran, however, made no
moves toward restarting its nuclear program, even though it faced potential attack from
one of the world's largest atomic powers.15 5 It was not until midway through the Iran-Iraq
war that the nuclear program would be restarted.
The Nuclear Renaissance
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, as Iran was being pushed further
away from the possibility of victory, research in the nuclear arena was restarted. In 1982,
the head of the Nuclear Technology Center at Esfahan announced that Iran would begin
153 Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
154 Parillo, "Iran's Nuclear Program," 1.
155 Halloran, "Soviet Buildup Near Iran Tested Carter."
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importing nuclear technology again for the first time since the Revolution.15 6 By 1985
construction of facilities at Natanz had begun.157
The revival of the nuclear program became official in 1985 with Ayatollah
Khomeini's call for research into gas centrifuge technology. Iran gained support for its
program from both Argentina and China while strategically avoiding its former nuclear
allies and proponents of non-proliferation - the United States, Germany and France.15 It
also received nuclear intelligence from the illicit Kahn network and, by 1988, had gathered
enough knowledge to begin building its centrifuges.
The Death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the ascension of Ali Khamenei
brought new attitudes and even stronger support to the Iranian nuclear establishment. The
new Ayatollah, along with President Rafsanjani, began pushing for covert expansion of all
nuclear activities including conversion, reprocessing and enrichment.159 Iran increased its
pace of development and signed nuclear deals with China, North Korea and Pakistan.160
By the late 1990s, nuclear research had become a matter of the "highest priority" in
Iran and garnered widespread attention in the international community.161 It became a
rallying point for the domestic political identity of the Iranian people, but attracted
sanctions and derision internationally.
Waiting for T: Sanctions and Isolation
When the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) - an exiled opposition group
- exposed Iran's covert enrichment activities in 2002, the United States, United Nations, and
European Union responded almost immediately by issuing sanctions calling on Iran to
declare and halt all enrichment and reprocessing activities. There has been speculation for
156 The New York Times, "Iran to Restudy A-Power."
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some time that Iran might be covertly pursuing weapons technology, but the
announcement was still a shock to the international community. It proved that Iran was
defying its commitments under the NPT and flaunting international law. All eyes were now
turned to Iran, waiting for it to make the next move.
Iran formally declared their construction and enrichment activities to the IAEA in
February of 2003. Leaders maintained the belief that they were not in a state of non-
compliance yet, though, because under the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) they only had to
declare nuclear activities 180 days before introducing nuclear material. Iran was still in the
construction phase at the time.162 The IAEA was not fully satisfied with Iran's initial
declaration and called on the state to allow further verification and cooperation.
In December 2003, Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT, but by early
2004 the IAEA reported that there were outstanding issues with Iran's safeguards. In
September 2005 the IAEA officially adopted a resolution declaring Iran in a state of non-
compliance. 163 This declaration fueled international opposition and sanctions were further
strengthened around the globe.
In recent speeches by President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei, Iran's nuclear program has been referred to as a "defining element of its
national identity."164 Nuclear power is labeled as a hallmark of modernization for Iran and
a matter of sovereignty. This feeling is especially prevalent among the youth, who make up
a majority of Iran's population.165 With a median age of 26.4, Iran society is largely led by
this youth bulge, many of whose members seem to have taken up the nuclear program as
their political banner. 166
162 Parillo, "Iran's Nuclear Program."
163 Details on the specific actions and timeline can be found on the IAEA website at IAEA &
Iran, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml.
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There were demonstrations on university campuses throughout Iran after the
government announced that it would sign the additional protocol of the NPT in 2003. The
educated youth have also "warned their elders against capitulating to external pressures"
by agreeing to give up their nuclear program or any aspect of their nuclear technology.167
So far the leadership of Iran seems to be on the same page as most of the youth.
Thus far the nuclear program in Iran has brought little more than negative attention
to the state on an international scale, but domestically it is hailed as a success. It has kept
Iran on the global radar and held international focus for nearly a decade. Iran is positioned
to possibly become a major player in international affairs and it has proven itself to be a
strong, independent state.
In 2005 Iran briefly halted enrichment activities so that it could engage in
negotiations with the European Union. It was being addressed as an equal and invited to
participate in an important political discussion and, therefore, was willing to give up some
ground on its nuclear program. But the talks quickly turned sour after the election of
President Ahmadinejad and Iran restarted all of its nuclear activities declaring that it would
never stop them again.168
In 2006, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully begun
enriching uranium and stated that completion of a full nuclear fuel cycle was now one of
Iran's most important goals. It is estimated that Iran has over 4,500 active centrifuges and a
stockpile of over 3,000lbs of low-enriched uranium today.169 The IAEA officially reported
Iran to United Nations Security Council on Feb 4, 2006 and the UNSC called on Iran for
immediate compliance on all nuclear issues.170 Iran refused to be compliant and continued
to increase its nuclear activities. The international community has responded with further
sanctions and there has been very little movement toward finding a compromise.
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VI. Conclusion: The Need for Understanding
Alternative Explanations for Iran's Nuclear Ambitions
Some argue that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is not a matter of prestige, but a
quest for increased state security. Scholars cite Khomeini's decision to restart the nuclear
weapons research program after the Iran-Iraq war as evidence that the program was
motivated by security concerns.
While there is obviously some consideration of state security in any state's decision
to go nuclear - a nuclear weapon is, above all other things, a powerful military tool- it does
not fully explain the Iranian situation.
It is true that the war with Iraq taught Iranian leaders that they would have to
defend their state from weapons of mass destruction attacks because no one else would
and that they view Israel, a nuclear state, as their main rival in the region, but both these
factors have implications far beyond the security realm.
During the war, Iran was the victim of chemical weapon attacks - an action that had
been illegal since the 1925 Geneva Protocol and was the subject of many international
conventions and discussions. 171 Iran was left to fend for itself, though and received no
direct support or assistance. Following the war, Iranian leaders realized that they no longer
played any sort of role in the international community. They would need to fend for
themselves from now on and take drastic measures to restore the state's lost reputation
and respect. Leaders set out to find a way "to receive proper respect as a major Middle
171 Culminating in the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1992/1993 and the formation of
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Organisationfor the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.opcw.org/.
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Eastern country."172 They did this by beginning an extensive nuclear research program,
presumably to defend their state from future attacks.
After its revival the 1980s, though, the path of Iran's nuclear program has not
progressed parallel to changes in its security situation. Since the 2001 joint invasion of
Afghanistan and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Iran has been surrounded by troops hostile
to its nuclear intentions. Rather than reacting with caution, though, Iran has ramped up its
nuclear activities and gone public with its intentions. If Iran were truly concerned for its
security, it should not be antagonizing the West with troops stationed so close to its
borders.
The United States has proven that it will not hesitate to take military actions against
states it believes harbor terrorists or nuclear weapons - both of which Iran has been
accused of - but Iran has not let this curtail its nuclear ambitions. The more pressure the
Western world puts on Iran to halt its nuclear enrichment, the more determined it seems to
become to increase its activities. It has willingly placed itself in a position of strategic
vulnerability while fighting for recognition and respect.
The threats against Iran have not just come from the Western world, either. Saudi
Arabia has threatened multiple times to pursue its own nuclear program is Iran does not
halt its production. And Israeli leaders have declared their open hostility toward Iran for
years. Deputy Prime Minister Mofatz publicly announced that "If Iran continues with its
programme for developing nuclear weapons, we will attack it."173 Even when Saudi Arabia
announced that it had made a deal with Israel to use Saudi air space if and when it attacked
Iran, the pace of its nuclear program has not slowed. 174
172 "It expects the powerful states, especially the US, to consult it with respect to any
endeavor in the Middle East." Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, 20.
173 BBC News, "Israeli Minister Threatens Iran."
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In the face of open threats and a close US military presence Iran's nuclear program
has embarked on its most ambitious decade yet. It has made itself a target of preemptive
attack for the sake of and incomplete and, as of yet, ineffective nuclear program.
As the second largest state in the Middle East and the third most populous, the
Iranian presence in the region cannot be ignored; yet, it does not often receive the respect
from its neighbors that it believes it should. It remains isolated and condemned, but
continues to fight back. Without a change in policies toward Iran from the West and the
Middle East it is unlikely the state will ever renounce its nuclear ambitions.
The Need for Policy Change
Sanctions and statements of disapproval have not yet served their purpose of
crushing Iran's economy and forcing it to give up its nuclear program. It is unlikely that
they will do so in the future either. The international community has been treating Iran as a
criminal state, trying to punish it for pursuing a technology it believes it deserves, but has
only fueled its resistance. This punishment process may have been effective if Iran were
pursuing nuclear weapons for purely strategic or security concerns. When prestige is the
main motivation, though, sanctions just push the possibility of a resolution further and
further away.
The 2009 contested elections in Iran opened a window of opportunity for the Western
World to change its approach to the Persian state. Two years later, though, it appears as
though the world will allow this window to close without taking advantage of it. As
domestic unrest spreads throughout the Middle East today, Iran included, there is an
opportunity to form new alliances and institute new policies to support the changing face
of government. The West has the chance to restart negotiations and find new allies in the
quest for regional stability and peace.
Engaging Iran, though, will require giving it the respect it believes it deserves.
Compromise and cooperation rather than derision and oppression can serve to make a
hostile nation more willing to make amends with the international community. Providing
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Iran with opportunities for political or economic growth, rather than continuing sanctions,
may lessen its dependence on nuclear power. If Iran has the opportunity and the resources
to pursue a faster and easier path to prestige, it may finally be persuaded to give up its
nuclear pursuits and join the international community.
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CHAPTER 6: EGYPT'S STRUGGLE FOR PRESTIGE
I. Introduction
The name Egypt conjures up images of pyramids, gold, pharaohs and all the
grandeur of the ancient world. But the recent history of Egypt is far less glamorous. Egypt
was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the 1500s and remained under its rule for nearly
four centuries as both a territory and tributary state. Soon after it regained independence
it's the early 1900s it became involved in the war with Israel and has been fighting for
peace and stability ever since.
Egypt has a long and glorious history, yet it struggled to find respect and legitimacy
in world affairs for decades following its disastrous loss to Israel in the Six Day War. Its
poor performance hurt both its domestic and international reputation and threatened to
undermine its celebrated history. Through shrewd political maneuvering and one
successful war effort, Egypt managed to recover some of this lost prestige and prove that it
is an important player in international affairs.
From the October War to the Camp David Accords, Egypt has consistently proven
itself to be the Arab leader in the Middle East Conflict. It has a guaranteed spot at the
negotiating table and enjoys a special relationship with the most powerful state in the
world - the United States.
There is still a long way to go toward achieving Middle Eastern peace and returning
Egypt to its former glory, but the two ends have now become inextricably linked. If Egypt is
able to secure a lasting peace with Israel it will become a model for other states to follow
for years to come. Egyptian leaders can tout the pride and resilience of their state and
prove to their people that they will not let the glory of Egypt subside, empire or no empire.
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II. Identity in Egypt
Egypt is home to one of the oldest civilizations in the world with one of the most well
known histories. Yet it took centuries before anyone thought to cultivate this identity in the
modern age.
For close to four hundred years Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire in one form or
another. During this period of time Egypt's history became inextricably linked to the
history of Istanbul. In the nineteenth century, identity in Egypt was fragmented and
localized. People associated themselves with local cities and regions rather than feeling
pride in their shared culture and history. It was not until World War II and the fall of the
Ottoman Empire that any modern identity was formed.
The breakup of the Ottoman Empire created a large number of new states in the
Middle East, with no clear way to distinguish them other than geographical boundaries.
These states had shared a single culture and history for centuries and were suddenly
struggling to create distinct cultural identities and consolidate their domestic political base.
For Egypt the tool for creating this identity was found in the ancient world and the history
of the Pharaohs.
Egyptian intellectuals and elites began promoting the image of "ancient Egyptians as
illustrious ancestors all the world might envy."175 They told the stories of the Pharaohs and
the magnificent achievements of the ancient world. The idea of ancestors and family is
essential to the Egyptian way of life. There is a large portion of Shari'a law regulating family
affairs and students are taught that family is the "cornerstone of society" in Egypt.
The government was able to capitalize on this new historical image by promoting
tourism to ancient monuments, mandating the study of ancient history into schools and
publicizing images of this Egyptian identity. This focus on cultivating a statewide identity
175 Reid, Whose Pharoahs?, 288.
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has permeated all aspects of society over the past hundred years and helped to greatly
reduce the amount of ethnic conflict throughout Egypt.176
In a region dominated by conflicts over ethnicity Egypt stands out for its relative
homogeneity. 99.6% of people in Egypt identify themselves as Egyptian.177 This is not to
say that there aren't minority groups in Egypt, but even the smallest groups dislike being
called minorities and refer to themselves as Egyptian instead.178 This homogeneity is
largely a result of Nasser's nationalization policies of the 1950s that consolidated property
ownership and forced disparate groups to coexist in a single area.
There are still some recognized differences between groups in Egyptian society,
with the most pronounced divisions occurring in the area of religion. 90% of Egyptians are
Muslim; the other 10% are Christian - generally Copts.179 Muslims and Christians have been
able to coexist peacefully throughout most of Egypt's recent history, as neither group has
generally been treated as superior or inferior to the other.
Egypt is officially an Islamic state with a law code based off Shari'a principles yet the
Coptic population does not consider themselves to be minorities. "For them there is no
ethnic difference between themselves and the Muslim population, since both religious
groups are ethnically Egyptian tracing their roots to the Pharaohs."180 In fact, the Copts
consider themselves to be the purest sub-group in Egypt because their ancestors never
intermarried with Muslims conquerors of other cultures.181
Egyptian identity in the twentieth century has usually been defined by one of four
schools of thought: Egyptian, Mediterranean, Arab or Islamic. 182 Each school has been
176 Stowasser, "Tahlil Marriage in Shari'a," 177.
177 "Egypt," CIA World Factbook.
178 Brown and Shahin, "Egypt," 222.
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182 Ibid., 90-92.
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dominant at one point in time, leading to changes in policy and leadership as the state's
grand strategy shifted along with its identity.
The Egyptian school developed out of the need for a defining identity following the
breakup of the Ottoman Empire. It emphasizes Egypt's uniquely long history and the legacy
of the Pharaohs. This school gained popularity in the 1920s as a series of archaeological
discoveries - including the unearthing of King Tut's tomb - were announced to the world.
This way of thinking has gained popularity again today as a motto of the current revolution.
Since January of 2011 the people have shown a dramatic increase in their level of "pride to
be an Egyptian."183
The Mediterranean school also emphasized the greatness of the ancient empires,
but instead of stressing the differences between Egypt and its neighbors it downplayed
them. This school focused on the collective history of the Mediterranean region as the
home of the world's most powerful empires. It had the least amount of support among the
four schools because it did not provide a strong image of Egyptian greatness and
prosperity.
The Islamic school, as its name implies, focused on the religious makeup of Egypt
and the belief that Egypt should be governed by Shari'a laws. This way of thinking gained
popularity after the 1967 loss to Israel. Many Egyptians believed that the Six Day War was
punishment for their lack of faith. Adherence to the Islamic school almost broke the ethnic
peace in Egypt when Sadat exiled of the Coptic Pope in 1981.184 The stability of Egypt was
kept in tact, though, when Mubarak came to power and promoted the image of a Pan-Arab
nation.
The Arab school is probably the most well known of the Egyptian identities. It
emphasizes the common language of the Arab nations and focuses on the recent history of
the region rather than the ancient. It emphasizes Egypt's place as the rightful leader of the
183 Elkhair, "90 pct of Egyptians."
184 The Age, "Coptic Pope Sent into Desert Exile," 9.
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Arab world since it is the largest Arab state. It first became popular following the 1925
Syrian revolt against French authorities. The Egyptian government expressed their support
for the Syrian revolutionaries and for all oppressed "Eastern" states wanting to take action
against the European powers.185
Pan-Arabism continued to rise during the first half of the twentieth century, but was
almost lost to Islamism under Sadat's rule. When Mubarak came to power in the 1980s,
though, he took up the banner of pan-Arabism and used it to gain support for his policies in
support of Middle Eastern peace.
II. Egypt's Fall: The Six-Day War
Egypt's level of prestige has been linked to the existence of Israel ever since its
creation in 1948. Egyptians saw the existence of a Jewish state as an abomination and an
embarrassment to the entire Arab world. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the first President of Egypt,
capitalized on this sentiment and made Egypt into the leader of the fight against Israel. He
sought to help Egypt "reclaim its birthright and restore the lost national prestige" by
becoming a global leader and the state responsible for removing the Israeli threat.186 His
end goal might not have been met, but his approach seemed to work.
Egypt enjoyed good relations with the world's two most powerful states - The
United States and Soviet Union throughout most of the 1950s and 60s. When Egypt was
attacked by European powers during the 1956 Suez Crisis both superpowers came down
on the side of Egypt. It also gained support from the majority of Middle Eastern states and
was looked at to lead the region against Israel. This position of leadership is why Egypt
suffered such a severe drop in prestige following the Six-Day War.
185 Coury, "Who "Invented" Egyptian Arab Nationalism? Part 1."
186 Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," 203.
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The Six-Day War
There has been much debate over the years as to whether the Six-Day War
constituted a preemptive attack by Israel or whether it was a matter of self-defense. The
results, though, are clear: a decisive Israeli victory and major losses for all Arab states
involved.
The Israeli air force led the attack against Egypt, Syria and Jordan with air raids on
June 5, 1967. The initial attack destroyed nearly 80% of the three states' warplanes.187 The
Arab states deployed forces in retaliation, but for all intents and purposes "by noon the war
was essentially won."188 The Israelis had initiated such a decisive attack that there was
never really hope for the Arab states to retaliate or stop the advance.
The air war was quickly transformed into a ground campaign in the Sinai with
Israeli forces pushing forward and Egyptians retreating. Egypt had been increasing it forces
in the Sinai in the weeks preceding the war so that, by the time the war began, 50,000 men
were stationed at or near the Israeli border.189 Even so, the Egyptian forces were unable to
hold their line.
On the third day the fight moved to Jerusalem and by the fourth Jordan had
surrendered, solidifying Israel's position in the West Bank. Israel then turned its attention
to the retreating Egyptians and the Syrians holed up in bunkers.190 By the fifth day of
fighting, Egypt had lost the Sinai completely and the Arab world began to turn against its
former leader.
Other Arabs led attacks on the Egyptian embassy in Algiers and the Egyptian
cultural center in Tunis. Nasser was declared a traitor and fell into depression. He declared
187 Kurtulus, "The Notion of a "Pre-emptive War," 220.
188 "Memorandum From the President's Special Counsel (McPherson) to President
Johnson," FRUS.
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Meeting," FRUS.
190 For a detailed day-by-day breakdown of the fighting see: Oren, Six Days of war.
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his official resignation the same day, but rescinded it after he was met with a spontaneous
swell of popular support. Protestors lined the streets in Cairo and other major Middle East
cities begging him to reconsider. King Hussein wrote him personally to ask for his support
and politicians and intellectuals throughout the country declared that Nasser was the only
leader who could keep them together.191
The sixth and final day of fighting marked Israel's conquest of the Golan Heights and,
subsequently, the Syrian forces. With no will left in them, all parties finally agreed to a
ceasefire agreement, validating Israel's territorial gains and acknowledging its military
superiority.
As it had been predicted at the very beginning of the war, Israel emerged the
overwhelming victor after just six days of fighting. It had gained control over the Sinai,
Golan Heights and all of Mandated Palestine, quadrupling it territorial area.192 Many of
these areas were of strategic importance and significantly reduced Israel's geographic
vulnerability to future attacks. It had also outlasted the Arab troops in terms of casualties
with a rate of 25 to 1.193
In just under a week Egypt, Jordan and Syria had managed to lose large portions of
their armed forces and strategic pieces of territory to a state they considered unworthy of
existing. This loss was especially dramatic for Egypt, which had led the charge and had
significantly stronger material capabilities than Israel. On paper, Egypt should have been
victorious. 19 4
Egypt's defeat happened so quickly and publicly that it became a part of popular
culture. A famous Israeli joke retold many times in the press has a colleague questioning
Moshe Dayan, the general that led the Israeli army in the Six-Day War, about his plans for
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the next day. "How about invading another Arab country?" says the colleague. "What would
we do in the afternoon?" replies Dayan.195
Over the course of six days Egypt had gone from being a regional power with a long,
proud history to being the punch line of a bad joke. It had also lost a major ally as the
United States solidified its relationship with Israel and began seriously limiting its
interactions with Egypt. Egypt needed to find a way to save its reputation and prove to the
world that it was not a state that could be laughed off.
IV. The Paths Not Taken
Egypt has followed a two-step path toward status adjustment since its loss in 1967.
It began with the quick and decisive path of war and then switched to the longer-lasting,
but less palatable path of political negotiation. Why were these the best two paths for
Egypt? Its recent history had made both economic and nuclear status adjustment
impossible.
The Economic Path
Throughout the early twentieth century Egypt possessed an import substitution
economy. It had a very limited industrial base and most industries and people relied on
imported products rather than items produced at home. Egypt had virtually no export
sector.
Following the 1952 Revolution and the end of the monarchy, Egyptian leaders
attempted to nationalize the industrial sector. New protectionist policies were put in place
to defend domestic industry and the government began taking over all major
manufacturing. The process was unsuccessful, though. Import substitution had diminished
the quality of products manufactured at home so badly that Egyptians could no longer
produce any exportable commodities. 196
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By the time the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, Egypt was suffering from a shortage of
foreign currency and found itself in the midst of both food and housing crises. Throughout
the 1970s the Egyptian economy struggled just to keep its people alive and satisfied. The
government had introduced food subsidies during World War II, and continually increased
the number of foods and commodities subject to rationing over the next few decades.197
When the government tried to remove the subsidies in 1977 it resulted in wide spread
rioting until the subsidy system was reinstated' 98.
Egypt did not have a dependable industrial base prior to the war and it did not
experience and sort of economic turnaround in the years immediately following its loss.
Without any high-value commodities or options for financial sector development, it was
impossible for Egypt to take the economic path toward status adjustment.
The Nuclear Path
The Egyptian nuclear program began in 1954, like many others, as a response to
President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech and his call for the powerful nations of
the world to stand up and begin researching nuclear technology.
Reports by the International Institute of Strategic Studies argue that the United
Nations conference at which Eisenhower gave his speech "not only provided the basic
structure for the AEE's [Atomic Energy Establishment] programmes, but was also the
foundation for a series of negotiated bilateral cooperative agreements with foreign
countries. Arguably, it was this willingness on the part of foreign countries to assist that
allowed Egypt's programme to develop in the first place."199
197 For an in depth look at the Egyptian food subsidy system throughout the twentieth
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Nasser took advantage of this foreign assistance and founded the Egyptian Atomic
Energy Commission in 1955.200 Egypt's first reactor, which had been provided by the Soviet
Union, went online in 1961, but was not capable of producing weapons-grade material.201
When Israel announced that it was starting its own nuclear program in 1960 Egypt
launched into its most aggressive period of nuclear expansion. By the time of the Six Day
War, though, it had still not achieved any sort of domestic nuclear capability. Nasser
became calling for the development of a pan-Arab nuclear program, which would be hosted
by Egyptian nuclear facilities, but funded by all members of the Arab League.202
Egypt was never able to complete its own fuel cycle and relied on imported
technology for all of its nuclear research. When the Six-Day War occurred, Egypt was no
closer to building an atomic bomb than it had been a decade earlier. Faced with the
daunting possibility of attempting to build a nuclear weapon and failing - especially since
Israel had already succeeded in doing so - Egypt's leaders decided to stop the nuclear
program rather than increasing it. They could not be accused of losing to Israel in the race
for nuclear technology if they never attempted to do so.
In 1968 Egypt signed the NPT and gave up its right to choose a nuclear path in the
future. Over the next few years Egypt was instrumental of bringing the proposal for a
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East to the United Nations and it eventually
began calling for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone as well. 20 3
Aside from the technological hurdles, Egypt also had to deal with the very real threat
of an Israeli preemptive attack if they were seen to be pursuing nuclear power. Prime
Minister Begin publicly stated on multiple occasions that "Israel would not tolerate any
enemy - Arab or otherwise - developing weapons of mass destruction intended for use
200 Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt: Nuclear Overview."
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against Israel" and that if the Arab world were able to gain a nuclear capacity "another
holocaust would happen in the history of the Jewish people."204 If that reactor was found on
the soil of Egypt, the leader in the fight against Israel, it is possible that Israel would have
carried through with their threat and once again attack the Egyptian homeland.
V. The First Chosen Path: War
The Six Day War permanently altered the relationships between the Middle East
states. It served as a catalyst for the pan-Arab attitude that had been developing in recent
decades and solidified the divide between Israel and the rest of the Middle East. Anwar
Sadat used this attitude as a rallying point and as he began calling for increased Arab unity.
T1 (Oct 6,1973: The T2(1978: The Camp TA (1980s - today)
October War) David Accords)
High High High
Average Average -- Average
Low Low Low
Very Low Very Low Very Low
Nqure 6: igypt's Itth ofStatus Adjustment
Sadat frowned upon the division between Arab states along the lines of
"revolutionary" and "conservative" and thought that states should instead be divided by
where they stand on the fight against Israel. Sadat advocated policies of nonintervention
between Arab states and paid visits to many Arab leaders to show his solidarity. He became
the first Arab head of state to visit both Iraq and Kuwait.205
204 The Age, "Israel will bomb reactor again."
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Egypt was able to capitalize on this newfound cohesion by uniting the embarrassment
and loss of prestige that all the Middle Eastern states had faced at the hands of Israel. He
turned the region's shared failure into a drive for war. He rallied some of the most powerful
Arab states to plan for attack, this time in a way they could gain first advantage.
The Yom Kippur/October War
On October 24, 1972 Sadat convened a meeting of the Armed Forces Supreme Council
and told them to plan for war, whether or not they received Soviet Military assistance.
Anyone who did not immediately support his plan was removed from their position and
replaced with someone more sympathetic to his plans. 206
Such drastic steps may have been unnecessary, though, since Soviet military supply
shipments eventually came through to both Egypt and Syria. By the time both state's
leaders - along with Jordan's King Hussein - met in September 1973, they had fully stocked
and replenished military supplies.207 Syria's President Hafiz al-Assad even overhauled his
state's military, removing corruption, improving training and motivating soldiers to be as
good as the weapons they were given.208
The new weapons, supplies and attitudes gave all three states renewed confidence in
their ability to win a retaliatory war and helped push the odds further in favor of the Arab
forces. When war finally broke out on October 6, everything had lined up perfectly. The
Arab's were positioned for the quick and easy victory they would need to show their
superiority and regain their regional status. They presented a unified front, solidified by
near-perfect coordination between the Egyptian and Syrian militaries and managed to take
Israel completely by surprise.209
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207 Quandt, Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War.
208 The Syrian force now numbered seven million - larger and more well-armored than
many of the former European military powers: Boyne, The Two O'clock War, 3.
209 Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy Since Camp David," 96.
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Prior to the opening of hostilities, the Arabs engaged in a disinformation campaign
aimed at hiding their true intentions. Not even the soldiers forming the front line knew that
they were being sent to attack Israel. 210 Sadat engaged in false peace negotiations with
Henry Kissinger and authorized large-scale military exercises by the Egyptian forces
throughout 1973.211 The first two times such exercises occurred Israel responded by
readying their forces before realizing that they were not actually under attack. The third
time, Israel thought it had learned its lesson and did not arm its troops. It was not until the
eleventh hour that leaders realized their mistake.
Israel could have responded to the invasion with an air attack, but Washington
urged Prime Minister Golda Meir not to take any action that could be considered
preemptive, forcing her to try and call up reserve forces to prepare a defense. 212 Nearly all
of Israel's reserve troops were off duty and at home with their families, though, since it was
Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of rest and the most holy day of the year.
No one in Israel or the United States had taken the threat of a surprise Arab attack
seriously prior to the October War. Sadat had made threats "to sacrifice one million
Egyptian soldiers" in the fight against Israel, but everyone thought that was just political
rhetoric aimed at inciting the masses.213 Washington considered Sadat to be a soft leader
who would not engage in war and Israel believed that its air force, which had been wildly
successful in 1967, was powerful enough to stop any attempted attack. All of these
assumptions were obviously incorrect as Israel learned in a devastating fashion.
Israel lost around 2,000 people in two weeks during the Yom Kippur War with
another 4,000 wounded. 214 The initial attack was so overwhelming that Moshe Dayan - the
Israeli general who had led Israel to victory in 1967 - reported to Meir only days after it
210 Parker, ed., The October War: a retrospective, 84. reports that "In a survey of 8,000
troops after the war, Lt. Gen Kakish reported that only one person knew on October 3,
three days before the war, that preparations were for an attack."
211 Stephens, "Caught on the Hop: The Yom Kippur War."
212 Jacobson, "How Golda Meir won the Yom Kippur war."
213 Stephens, "Caught on the Hop: The Yom Kippur War."
33 Parker, ed., The October War: a retrospective, 346.
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began that Israel was doomed to fail. He believed that the Syrians could not be stopped and
the Egyptian troops would never be pushed back beyond the canal. 215 His sense of defeat
was so thorough that Meir would not allow him to speak with the press or give public
reports on the progress of the war.2 16
After four days of Arab domination, Meir was able to negotiate an emergency airlift
with the United States that provided much needed supplies to the depleted Israeli
Reserves. Within a matter of days Israeli forces were able to get behind Egyptian lines and
push Syria back from the Golan Heights.217 They stalled the advance long enough to initiate
ceasefire agreements with the United Nations.
On October 22nd the United Nations issued UNSCR 338 calling for an immediate
ceasefire and a return to the 1967 peace agreement. 218 Israeli forces waited until the 25*
to pull out of Europe and it was another two weeks before Egypt agreed to sign a
provisional ceasefire. Negotiations with Syria lasted until 1974 before a disengagement
agreement was signed, but the fighting stopped far earlier.
Egypt was unable to recover its lost territory in the October War, but it was able to
prove that it could fight the Israelis and hold its own. It captured the attention of the United
States and Israel and incentivized both states to take another look at the possibility of
peace. Prior to the October War Israel had no reason to engage in political negotiation with
the Arab states. It was the clear regional power and had no reason to fear losing this power.
After the war, though, the possibility of losing its regional position caused Israel to rethink
its hardliner stance.
215 Jacobson, "How Golda Meir won the Yom Kippur war."
216 Boyne, The Two O'clock War, 55.
217 Stephens, "Caught on the Hop: The Yom Kippur War."
218 Jacobson, "How Golda Meir won the Yom Kippur war."
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The war did not fully revive the lost prestige of Egypt, but it elevated it far enough
that it could try a new approach. This time the Egyptian leaders chose the slower and less
palatable, but more permanent path of political negotiation.
V. The Second Chosen Path: Politics
Almost immediately after signing the ceasefire agreement Egypt began shifting it
approach to Israel. Sadat took the reins of the Middle East Peace Process and solidified his
country's position at the forefront of negotiations. Egypt became the champion of a
peaceful resolution and the go-to Arab state for both the United States and Israel
throughout the peace process.
Sadat's decision to take a political role in the Middle East had been building for a few
years, but it was not until after the October War that he had enough leverage to actually
bring Israel to the table. Talks with President Carter and President Ceausescu of Romania
had convinced Sadat that there was a psychological barrier with Israel that could never be
solved by military conflict. War would just beget more war unless a more direct approach
was taken.219
Sadat knew that peace was an unpalatable for many Arab states and risked Egypt's
regional security and stability by taking a stance that would anger many of its neighbors.
He faced threats of economic and political isolation from the Arab League and could even
have made his state into a military target is the Arab world decided to launch another
attack on Israel and did not receive Egyptian support.
Egypt's first step toward political prestige came with the Sinai II agreement of 1975.
The agreement drew clear lines of engagement, allowed Israeli ships use of the Suez Canal
and called for the establishment of buffer zones, three years of non-belligerency and US
mediation if either side was found in violation of the agreement.220
219 Sadat, In Search of Identity.
220 "Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt", Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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Unsurprisingly, this agreement was not received well by the other Arab states.
Egypt was accused of abandoning its neighbors and looking out for its own interest. At the
same time, though, most of the states in the Middle East had started to become wary of war.
Saudi Arabia helped to broker peace in the civil war in Lebanon and brought Syria and
Egypt back onto good terms following Assad's scorn over the Sinai II agreement.221 The two
states even joined together to push for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference.
In its first year, Egypt's push for political status adjustment had immediate and
impressive results. It helped develop Egypt's relationship with the United States and
created a model for foreign policy that was used by both Saudi Arabia and Syria. With only
minor backlash from the Arab community Egypt had managed to set itself up as the center
for negotiations on Middle East peace and its goals and opinions were being heard and
achieved.
In November of 1977 Sadat received an official invitation from Prime Minister Begin
to fly to Jerusalem and negotiate one-on-one. The visit received mixed reactions in the
Middle East. Syria, Libya, Iraq and the PLO were adamantly opposed Sadat's trip while
Morocco, Sudan, Somalia and Oman praised his peaceful approach. Saudi Arabia, Jordan
and the Gulf States remained neutral on the issue not wanting to alienate themselves from
either side in the conflict.222
Bombs were set off at the Beirut headquarters of an Egyptian national airline and at
the Embassy in Damascus protesting Sadat's visit.223 Yet he refused to give in to threats.
This meeting was a necessary step for the path of political negotiation and would not be
given up, even in the face of a very real terrorist threat.
221 Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process, 8.
222 This list of reactions is compiled from various sources including: Bradley, The Camp
David Peace Process; Sahliyeh, "Jordan and the Palestinians"; Bangor Daily News, "Sadat's
Visit Shocks Arab World", 2.
223 Boca Raton News, "Arab anger mounts by the hour."
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Sadat did not completely ignore such protests, though. Aware of his precarious
position in Middle Eastern opinion, he agreed to the meeting, but made it known that he
would be negotiating on behalf of the Arab world, not Egypt alone. In his speech to the
Israeli Parliament he called for Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories, creation of a
self-governing Palestinian state and an adherence to UN standards for peace and
security.224
Sadat's speech did not bring anything new to the peace process, but his trip did. As
the first Arab head of state to visit Israel, Sadat had no model on which to base his conduct.
His choice to visit memorials to Israeli soldiers killed in the Middle East conflict and sign
the visitors' book at the state Holocaust memorial showed respect to Israel that no other
Arab leader had ever shown. 225 Sadat's personality helped smooth over the history of
conflict between the two states and set the stage for peace negotiations to really take off.
The United States - the party responsible for organizing the visit - was resistant to
Egypt's demands at first, believing that they were too one-sided. At Israel's encouragement,
though, the United States brought back a counter proposal that was more palatable to the
Egyptian position. The idea of "peace by concentric circles" called for an agreement to be
formed between Egypt, the US and Israel and then built upon as it brought in larger groups
of states starting with the most moderate and extending to the most resistant.226
On December 25th, Sadat and Begin met again at what was referred to as the Ismailia
Summit. By this time negotiations had shifted to focus almost entirely on forming a
bilateral peace. The leaders divided negotiations into two fronts: political and military.
There were multiple obstacles on both fronts, though, and no agreement could be reached.
The peace process stalled for close to nine months before restarting and taking its largest
step yet.
224 Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process, 17.
225 Barker, "Sadat, Begin Build a Bridge," 6.
226 Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process, 20.
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Sadat and Begin met with President Carter at Camp David on September 7,1978 to
begin work on a comprehensive agreement to restart the peace process and hopefully
achieve success. The results of this summit became known as the Camp David Accords,
which laid out details for the peace process in three "frameworks". 227
The first framework regarded the future of Gaza and the West Bank. It called for a
provisional government consisting of "a self-governing authority ... freely elected by the
inhabitants" to be put in place in both regions for no more than five years. All parties -
including Jordan and the Palestinians who would be invited to participate - would
reconvene within the first three years of the provisional government to determine the final
fate of the region. The agreement states that the Palestinian people must be allowed to
have a say in their fate, but that Israel and Egypt would be the leaders in all future
negotiations.
The second framework briefly reiterated the bilateral agreement between Egypt and
Israel. Both sides agreed to peaceful UN resolution of any future disputes and to return to
negotiations on a permanent bilateral peace treaty.
The final framework was that of "associated principles." It called for Egypt, Israel
and their neighbors to establish normal, peaceful relations with one another. It also
included a provision allowing the United States to participate in all aspects of negotiations
and stated that the United Nations Security Council would be asked to approve and endorse
all peace treaties.
In reality, the Camp David Accords were largely an agreement that future
negotiations would take place and not actually a solution. Yet it was the first major show of
good faith taken in the Middle East Peace Process and it set the stage for all subsequent
talks.
227 Full text of the Camp David Accords was retrieved from "The Camp David Accords,"
Jimmy Carter Library.
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By participating in the Accords Egypt had solidified its position as a leader in the
Middle East peace process and the only approachable Arab state. Sadat had received a
personal invitation to negotiate with the President of the United States, the most powerful
leader in the world. His signature was placed on an agreement being touted by the UNSC
for its benefits to global stability and he was given the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 - jointly
with Begin - becoming the first Egyptian Nobel laureate.
In his acceptance lecture Sadat praised the people of Egypt for being inclined to
peace and promoting the high road. He said that the character of his country was uniquely
suited to produce leaders in the quest for stability.
The road to peace is one which, throughout its history which coincides with the dawn of
human civilization, the people of Egypt have considered as befitting their genius, and
their vocation. No people on earth have been more steadfastly faithful to the cause of
peace, and none more attached to the principles of justice which constitute the
cornerstone of any real and lasting peace. 228
Egypt was no longer the "loser" in the conflict with Israel; it was the leader. It had
returned to its rightful place as the land "cherished by God Almighty" and finally received
"confirmation of the universal recognition of [the Egyptians'] relentless efforts"
Unfortunately the reactions of the Arab states were not nearly as positive.
Domestically, the Egyptian people seemed to support Sadat's desire for peace and
settlement. They had seen too much loss and destruction during their lifetime to become
vehemently opposed to the idea of resolution, even if they were still anti-Israel in practice.
Above all, foreign policy was not a major issue for the Egyptian people at the time. As one
American diplomat put it, "the single most sensitive issue in the country is changing the
price of bread."229 As long as Egypt was able to continue importing commodities and
subsidizing food costs, the people were relatively content.
Middle East Reactions
228 Anwar al-Sadat, "Nobel Lecture."
229 Quoted in: Hills, "Egyptians may take to streets if bread price rises."
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While Egypt's work toward peace drew praise from the West it was met with scorn
by its neighbors who believed that Egypt had abandoned the Arab world. When Sadat
traveled to Camp David the Arab League called a special meeting and publicly threatened to
kick Egypt out if it signed the Accords. It also called for moving Arab League headquarters
out of Cairo and even placing League sanctions against Egypt.
Aware of this disapproval and not wanting to alienate himself from the rest of the
Arab world, Sadat chose to take a hardliner position on the Palestinian issue. Previously
Egypt had allowed the sovereignty question to be pushed back from the forefront of
discussions, but after Camp David Sadat began calling for more immediate action. He laid
out a timeline for when self-determination should occur and stated that Egypt's obligations
to Israel, while important, would always be subservient to its duties to the rest of the Arab
world.230 He had gained support and respect from the western world for his role at Camp
David and was trying to do the same with the Arab states.
This new position threatened to once again derail the peace talks, but it also held the
Arab League threats at bay. Israel refused to agree to such rigid lines and Carter was forced
to carry compromise agreements between the two states for over a year before any
agreement could be reached. Egypt was playing a difficult balancing game trying to restore
both its regional and global prestige at the same time.
An official Israel-Egypt peace treaty was finally signed on March 26, 1979. In the
treaty both parties agreed to withdraw all armed forces and engage in peaceful relations.
The treaty set the permanent border between Egypt and Israel and established a "buffer
zone" to be occupied temporarily by United Nations peacekeeping forces.231 The issue of
Palestine and the fate of the Gaza strip were not determined in the peace treaty, but left for
future arrangements to determine.
230 Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process.
231 Full text of the Israel-Egypt Peace treaty was retrieved from: "Peace Treaty Between
Israel and Egypt," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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The signing of the peace treaty was met with immediate retaliation by members of
the Arab League. On March 27 the Arab League convened a summit in Baghdad and agreed
to take sweeping measures against Egypt. The League agreed to discontinue loans, aid,
investment and any other form of economic involvement with Egypt. It also agreed to
remove Egypt from the League and move headquarters out of Cairo. Many other Arab
organizations - including the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Conference and the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries - responded in kind by revoking
Egypt's membership. 232
The Arab League embargo was not entirely effective, though, since different states
had different interpretations of what exactly it meant. Some cut off trade with Egypt
completely while others only cut off certain supplies. A few Arab states - such as Saudi
Arabia and Lebanon - actually increased their levels of trade with Egypt from 1979 to
1980.233 Since the Arab League only controls state-led investments most private companies
continued to invest in Egypt. The majority of investment projects that were cancelled in
1979 were restarted by 1980.234
Since over two-thirds of foreign economic assistance two Egypt by this time was
coming from the United States the state was able to function normally even after losing
many of its Arab trading partners.235 The removal of Egypt from the Arab League had large
symbolic value, but it did not have any real repercussions.
The Arab League embargo began to fall apart almost as soon as it began. Multiple
regional conflicts erupted over the next couple years that stressed the unity of the anti-
Egypt front. The revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq War and multiple bi-lateral military
conflicts forced the Arab states to choose sides. Egypt's transition to peaceful negotiations
and the ascension of the Shah in Iran had taken two of the Middle East's most powerful
232 Lavy, "The Economic Embargo of Egypt," 420.
233 For more specific details on trade levels with Egypt see the Correlates of War Dyadic
Trade dataset: Barbieri, "TRADING DATA."
234 Lavy, "The Economic Embargo of Egypt," 422.
235 Weinbaum, "Dependent Development," 119-120.
129
contenders for regional domination out of play, leaving the field open for fighting and
contests aimed at gaining regional influence.
Six members of the Arab League - Syria, Libya, Algeria, Southern Yemen and the
PLO -boycotted the 1980 summit in Jordan in protest of the host country's support of Iraq
in the Iran-Iraq war and alleged support of a revolution against Syria's President Assad. 236
Arab leaders began to fear that a wave of "revolutionary Islam" would sweep through the
Middle East -originating in the successful revolution in Iran - and cause widespread
rebellions throughout the region.
The military conflicts between Iraq and Syria further divided the region and when
Jordan and Syria readied their troops for war against one another Saudi Arabia was forced
to intervene. The Saudi's were able to broker a resolution between the two sides, but were
criticized by Sadat who accused King Hussein of bribing the Arab states with oil rather than
actually negotiating a peace.
Egypt invited the United States to send troops to the region to keep the peace and
offered to station them on Egyptian territory. It was the only state that could openly make
such a gesture and it showed the other Arab nations that Egypt was essential to regional
stability and could not be excluded from regional affairs.
VII. Conclusion: A Never Ending Struggle for Peace
The Egypt-Israel peace treaty temporarily improved regional relations, but it did not
put an end to the Middle East conflict. In 1982 Israel took to the offensive once again and
invaded Lebanon in an attempt to crush resistant Palestinian forces. Egypt referred to the
invasion as a "slap in the face" and put a stop to the normalization process.237 When the
Sabra and Shatila massacres occurred, though, Egypt was forced to take a tougher stance
and break relations with Israel completely.
236 Tanner, "When Arabs Fight Arabs."
237 Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy Since Camp David," 98.
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On September 15 Israeli Defense Force troops invaded West Beirut - which they
had promised the Untied States they would not do - and took control of the city, including
the Palestinian refugee camps. The next day IDF forces allowed groups of armed Phalangist
militiamen - Palestinian Christians sympathetic to Israel - to enter the camps and begin
killing the refugees. The IDF made sure that no one escaped as prisoners were executed
over a three-day period. No complete census had been done on the dead, but it is estimated
that over 3,500 refugees were killed.23 8
Egypt immediately withdrew its ambassador from Jerusalem and halted the peace
process indefinitely. The two states did not engage in armed combat, but relations
remained strained, at best, over the next couple years.
Determined to prove to the world that the Camp David Accords had not tied Egypt's
hands when it came to fighting for Arab rights, Mubarak set three conditions for his state's
return to the process. All Israeli troops had to be withdrawn from Lebanon, an agreement
must be reached regarding the disputed Taba territory, and conditions of the Palestinian
refugees in occupied territories must be improved.
Mubarak refused to visit Jerusalem until these conditions were met. He instead spent
his time visiting Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and most other Middle Eastern
states. 239 He even began meeting with PLO leader Yasir Arafat to help the Palestinians find
new support in the wake of the violent Lebanese civil war that had broken out. Egypt
helped to mediate a peace deal between the Palestine National Council and Jordan in which
both sides agreed to work together toward achieving peace.
Egypt was no longer the only state seeking a peaceful resolution with Israel. The
stigma of the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty were slowly being
238 The best account of these massacres was compiled from a series of first-hand accounts
in: Shahid, "The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports."
239 Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy Since Camp David," 101-104.
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replaced with acceptance as other states began realizing they could not survive a future
littered with constant war.
At the November 1987 Arab League summit it was decided that that the embargo
with Egypt should be dropped because the League had no right to control the bilateral
relations of its member states. All but four Arab states - Algeria, Lebanon, Libya and Syria -
resumed normal relations with Egypt within three months. 240
Over the course of the 1980s, Egypt went from being a regional pariah to the model
upon which both Western and Arab states based their approach to the Middle East peace.
Egypt initiated itself in the political fabric of the region, weathered the backlash of its
original decision and came out on top. This shift was not due to any change in Egypt's
material power, but solely to its political maneuvering.241
Today Egypt has become synonymous with the cause of Middle East peace. As one
scholar put it, "historically, the course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict has been dictated by
Egypt's pivotal position in the Arab world."242 Through smart negotiating and risk-taking
Egypt has made itself a recognized contributor to regional stability and security and his
ridden this wave of prestige ever since.
The world no longer views Egypt as the loser in the Six-Day War, but as the leader in
an important and extremely difficult set of political negotiations. Egypt is regularly
consulted on Middle Eastern affairs and has been successful at getting its goals met
internationally. Egypt earned itself international respect and the benefits that come along
with it.
240 Ibid., 104.
241 From 1979-1990 Egypt consistently remained between 25t and 27t on the Correlates
of War CINC Scale; Singer, "Capability Distribution."
242 Gerges, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour," 72.
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Egypt seemed to have found its niche in world politics, content with the praise and
the recognition it received for its adherence to peaceful standards. The Revolution that
broke out in early 2011, though, may upset this balance. If Egypt is unable to restore peace
to its domestic politics than it may lose some of its credibility internationally. How can a
state be expected to lead the quest for Middle East peace when it cannot even create peace
within its borders?
Also, who is to say that the new government will even want to continue Egypt's role
in the peace process. If a new party comes to power focused on belligerency and proving
the greatness of the Egyptian people - a rallying cry for the revolution - it may seek to
show its strength through military means.
The path taken by the new Egyptian government will not just be determined by
which party comes to power, but by international reactions as well. If the Western and
Arab worlds allow Egypt to remain in its position of regional importance and continue
normal relations there will be little reason for the new government to change its current
approach. If, however, the new government is not recognized or is criticized as being illegal
and illegitimate it may drop its peaceful reputation and seek out another way to make its
greatness known to the world.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Prestige is a very important concept in international relations, yet it remains
stubbornly hard to define. There are many elements to prestige - status, centrality,
legitimacy, respect, etc. - all of which exist in some form or another in every state. A loss or
gain in one area will not necessarily alter the prestige of the state, but a major change in the
political or military arena might.
This is one of the hardest areas of prestige to explain and recognize. It is connected
to material power in the sense that major changes in power, such as the development of a
nuclear weapon, the decimation of an army or a revolution placing a new government in
power, can have drastic effects on a state's international status, but the two are not one in
the same. A state can experience changes in prestige without changes in power and vice
versa.
Very few political science scholars will argue that prestige is irrelevant, but they are
also reluctant to argue that it can be the main motivation behind controversial policy
decisions. The argument that this paper makes is just that, though. I believe that prestige
can actually overcome security concerns in some instances and understanding this is
important to the study and practice of international affairs.
Leaders may find it in their best interest to take a dangerous path toward status
adjustment in the hope that it will help them achieve their national goals further down the
road. A state with high prestige is always included in international summits and
negotiations and will have a say in the fate of its region, its neighbors and the rest of the
international system. Low status states are not invited to such discussions and must just
exist in the system that the higher-up states build for it.
When Prestige and Security Collide
One of the easiest ways to illustrate how prestige plays an important role in
international affairs is to look at key decision points in recent history where a state was
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forced to choose between the most secure path and the most prestigious. One such case is
the issue of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet republics.
The fall of the Soviet Union left thousands of fully-operation nuclear warheads in the
control of newly independent governments ill-equipped to secure and maintain such
technology. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan found themselves in possession of a nuclear
arsenal without having built, produced or paid for any element of the design. None of the
three states possessed the facilities needed for enrichment, reprocessing, assembly or
refurbishment of warheads. That hardly mattered, though, since the weapons they had
were fully-operation. This was especially striking in the case of Ukraine, which was home to
roughly 14% of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.2 43
The leaders of these republics were suddenly faced with the choice to keep the
nuclear forces, dismantle them or give them back to Russia. If security were the only
concern, the answer would have been clear: keep the weapons. Nuclear warheads are,
without question, the most powerful weapons in existence today. Thus far no state
possessing nuclear weapons has ever been attacked at home - with the possible except of
India and Pakistan whose history of animosity precedes their nuclear arsenal.
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had suddenly been thrust into a world where they
were hated and feared for their association to the Soviet Union, but were given the ultimate
weapon to protect their borders with and deter possible aggressors. Why, then, did all
three states ultimately give up their arsenals?
Some people argue that the decision was made because most of the warheads were
still under operational control in Russia and could not have been used anyway. Yet Russia
expressed fear that Ukraine might try to crack its security codes and take control over the
weapons. If these were possible, security theories suggest that all three states should have
tried to do so. None of the leaders in the three republics, though, ever publicly sought
243 Walker, "Nuclear Weapons and the Former Soviet Republics."
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operational control either by breaking Russian security codes or by asking to have them
turned over.244
Others argue that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan only gave up their nuclear
warheads because they feared a Russian invasion or attack if they did not do so. This may
be a true statement, but the republics also had the support and attention of the United
States at this point in time. It is unlikely that a Russian attack would have been allowed to
happen without some sort of retaliation, especially so soon after the end of the Cold War.
Whatever the cause, almost immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union the newly
formed republics joined together in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an
organization founded with the purpose of exercising joint command and control over
nuclear resources. At the same time, though, nearly all of the non-Russian republics had
expressed their desire to get rid of their nuclear weapons and were receiving a swell of
popular support.
These republics were all searching for ways to distance themselves from the former
Soviet Union, prove to the world that they could be trusted and get themselves a spot at the
table for international political negotiations. Their sovereignty had been restored at a time
when the nonproliferation regime was at its most pervasive. The Cold War had left the
world on edge, wary of nuclear war. The disaster at Chernobyl, which had occurred only
five years before, had proven to the world that nuclear technology was not as miraculous as
they once thought it was. "Chernobyl is everywhere!" became a rallying cry for antinuclear
movements and provoked debates throughout the Western world about the future of
nuclear power.245
The CIS quickly turned from an organization aimed at controlling nuclear weapons
to one responsible for finding the safest and most efficient way to dismantle and dispose of
244 Woolf, "91144: Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union."
245 Dobbs, "The Nuclear Accident in Chernobyl."
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them. Figuring out the exact logistics behind giving up the weapons would take another few
years, but the ball had been set in motion and the effects were almost immediate
All three former soviet republics were publicly praised for their decision to give up
nuclear weapons. The United States and Soviet Union thanked the republics for their
contribution to the START treaty, the international nonproliferation regime and the
strengthening of the NPT. They were invited to sit down with the United States and Russia
on multiple occasions to discuss the most efficient way to bring about disarmament and
they were the subject of many media reports across the world.
In two years Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had gone from being relatively
unknown and unimportant occupied territories to independent states that were household
names. When the transfer of nuclear weapons was finally completed in 1996 the three
states had given up their right to the world's most powerful weapon, but had gained the
support and respect of many powerful nations.246
Even today, these three states are remembered for their contributions to the world
of nuclear arms reduction. In 2009, when the original START treaty reached its expiration
date the United States and Russia issued a joint statement recognizing the "significant
contribution" of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to disarmament negotiations. The
statement concluded that "the value of the START Treaty was greatly enhanced" by the
willingness of these states to give up their arsenals. 247
Whether it was because of a Russian threat to seize weapons, the global
nonproliferation regime or simply a lack of interest in nuclear technology one thing is
certain, all of the former Soviet republics gave up their rights to the world's most powerful
weapon and have been praised for that decision for years. They gained respect, recognition
246 Kazakhstan had returned all missiles to Russia by February 1995, Ukraine by June of
1996 and Belarus' by November of 1996. Woolf, 91144: Nuclear Weapons in the Former
Soviet Union.
247 BBC Worldwide, "Russia, US joint Statement."
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and status from the decision to become nonnuclear states and have played an important
role in world arms reduction talks for nearly two decades now.
Final Thoughts
Not all states will chose the path of prestige when given a choice between that and
security. Some leaders are driven by fear and will do anything to protect themselves and
their state. Enough states would choose the path of prestige, though, that it is worth
studying and understanding.
Prestige motivations alter the way international relations function. Rather than
responding to fear tactics and threats of negative action, states motivated by prestige will
respond to compromises and offers of positive inducements. Knowing what motivates your
opponent and being open to different possibilities is essential to the operation of diplomacy
and negotiation.
Too often leaders threaten first and ask questions later, especially in the Western
world. Taking a moment to step back and evaluate less conventional paths and possibilities
may make international negotiations easier and more efficient. States, like people, do not
enjoy being insulted or rejected. Treating negotiating partners or rivals as inferior makes
them defensive and angry. Treating them with respect, though, makes them more willing to
compromise and engage in real discussions. As the old adage tells us, "you catch more flies
with honey than vinegar."
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